The Integrity of Marriage by Matsumura, Kaiponanea T.
William & Mary Law Review 
Volume 61 61 (2019-2020) 
Issue 2 Article 3 
11-2019 
The Integrity of Marriage 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the First Amendment Commons 
Repository Citation 
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, The Integrity of Marriage, 61 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 453 (2019), 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol61/iss2/3 
Copyright c 2019 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship 
Repository. 
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr 
THE INTEGRITY OF MARRIAGE
KAIPONANEA T. MATSUMURA*
ABSTRACT
While the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell v. Hodges re-
solved a dispute about access to legal marriage, it also exposed a rift
between the Justices about what rights, obligations, and social mean-
ings marriage should entail. The majority opinion described mar-
riage as a “unified whole” comprised of “essential attributes,” both
legal and extralegal. The dissents, in contrast, were more skeptical
about marriage’s inherent legal content. Justice Scalia, for instance,
characterized marriage as a mere bundle of “civil consequences”
attached to “whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements
[the law] wishes.” This side debate has taken center stage in several
recent disputes. In the years following Obergefell, courts, including
the United States Supreme Court, have considered whether the First
Amendment limits a state’s authority to require public accommoda-
tions to provide equal access to services related to a wedding cele-
bration, whether the right to marry encompasses the right to be
deemed a parent to a child born to one’s spouse, and whether states
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can withhold valuable employment benefits from married same-sex
couples. And numerous state legislatures have considered proposals
to get states “out of the marriage business.” All of these disputes ulti-
mately question how the positive law of marriage should be consti-
tuted and whether marriage is indeed a unified or integrated whole.
Some scholars have analyzed these questions from a historical or
functional perspective. This Article starts from a different point. It
accepts Obergefell’s invitation to think of marriage as an institution
that can be more or less “unified” or “integrated.” Along these lines,
it proposes a new framework for analyzing questions about the posi-
tive law of marriage: the continuum of integration and disintegra-
tion. This continuum has two interrelated dimensions. The first
involves the rights and duties that the law imposes upon spouses.
The second involves the uniformity of those legal rules across juris-
dictions. Marriage becomes more integrated when rights and social
norms mutually reinforce each other, and less integrated when rights
and norms conflict. The package of rights and norms becomes more
integrated when it is uniform across jurisdictions, and less integrat-
ed when jurisdictional differences prevent marriage from acquiring
a singular meaning. This integration framework has two benefits.
First, by focusing attention on the relationship between the functions,
laws, and norms of marriage, the integration framework provides a
methodology for assessing claims that changes to marriage laws are
bringing about marriage’s disintegration, rendering visible whether
and how disintegration occurs. Second, it identifies benefits and
costs of integration, demonstrating the extent to which marriage
relies on effectively communicating information about its content but
noting the downsides of centralization and state control. This inte-
gration framework enables a more principled analysis of efforts
targeted at reforming marriage laws and recognizing nonmarital
relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
In addition to castigating the Court’s central holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires states to allow same-sex couples
to marry, the dissenters in Obergefell v. Hodges unleashed a sur-
prising broadside on the bundle of state and federal laws that
constitute the positive law of marriage.1 Consider the following
statement by Justice Scalia: “The law can recognize as marriage
whatever sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes,
and can accord them favorable civil consequences.... Those civil
consequences ... can perhaps have adverse social effects, but no
more adverse than the effects of many other controversial laws.”2 Or
this statement by Justice Thomas: 
To the extent that the Framers would have recognized a natural
right to marriage that fell within the broader definition of
liberty, it would not have included a right to governmental
recognition and benefits. Instead, it would have included a right
to ... mak[e] vows, hold[ ] religious ceremonies celebrating those
vows, rais[e] children, and otherwise enjoy[ ] the society of one’s
spouse—without governmental interference.3
To these Justices, the positive law of marriage could be anything or
nothing at all.
These statements challenge the assumption that marriage should
be what Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Obergefell called a
“unified whole,” the inchoate notion that marriage should naturally
encompass a core set of rights and duties—both “symbolic” and
“material”—related to “establish[ing] a home and bring[ing] up
1. Laws turning on marital status—what I refer to as the “positive law of marriage”—
include rights and obligations pertaining to “taxation; inheritance and property ... evidence;
hospital access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption ...; the rights and benefits of
survivors; birth and death certificates; professional ethics rules; campaign finance restric-
tions; workers’ compensation benefits; health insurance; ... child custody, support, and vis-
itation,” and more. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015). Over one thousand
federal laws and regulations turn on marital status, United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744,
752 (2013), as do countless state and municipal laws and regulations. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135
S. Ct. at 2594-95.
2. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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children.”4 Under Justice Kennedy’s view, the positive law sets
marriage apart as “a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals,”5 providing “permanency
and stability” to the marital family,6 and enabling family members
“to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and
its concord with other families.”7 In Justice Kennedy’s telling,
changes to the positive law of marriage have only served to move
marriage closer to its platonic ideal.8 
This debate between the Obergefell Justices over whether mar-
riage has a necessary or ideal legal content is actively playing out
in state courts. For example, recent decisions have challenged the
connection between marriage and parentage. States have tradition-
ally assigned parental rights to husbands because of the marital
relationship.9 In Michael H. v. Gerald D., the Supreme Court upheld
a presumption of paternity statute over a challenge by a man with
a 98 percent probability of being the child’s biological father.10 The
Court noted that “given a certain relationship between the husband
and wife, the husband is to be held responsible for the child, and ...
the integrity of the family should not be impugned.”11 In a conflict
between biology and marriage, “our traditions have protected the
marital family.”12 The Arkansas Supreme Court recently took a dif-
ferent approach, upholding the state’s refusal to name married,
female, nonbirth mothers as a legal parents on their children’s
birth certificates.13 The court held that the marital presumption
statute was not actually about “the marital relationship of husband
and wife,” but rather “the relationship of the biological mother and
4. See id. at 2600-01 (majority opinion) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also
Harry D. Krause, Marriage for the New Millennium: Heterosexual, Same Sex—or Not at All?,
34 FAM. L.Q. 271, 275 (2000) (arguing that marriage was, until recently, “a unitary—‘one size
fits all’—concept”).
5. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599.
6. Id. at 2600.
7. Id. (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
8. See id. at 2596 (noting that changes to the law have “strengthened, not weakened, the
institution of marriage,” reflecting “new dimensions of freedom”).
9. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989) (plurality opinion).
10. Id. at 113-14, 131-35.
11. Id. at 119-20 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
12. Id. at 124.
13. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172-73 (Ark. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per
curiam).
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the biological father to the child.”14 The court accepted the State’s
argument that the “overarching purpose” of the statutory presump-
tion was to maintain accurate records of “vital events for purposes
of public health research and identification of public health trends,”
not the preservation of the marital family.15 In a similar dispute, an
Arizona appellate court was even more direct.16 The court dismissed
the argument that the purpose of Arizona’s statute was to extend
parenthood to children born to married spouses, contending instead
that “the purpose of the presumption statute is to assist in deter-
mining whether a man is a child’s biological father.”17 In a sweeping
statement, the court declared that “with the exception of adoption,
... parentage in Arizona is determined by biology.”18 Under this
reasoning, a birth mother’s husband would necessarily have an
inferior claim to an anonymous sperm donor.19
Both the Arkansas and Arizona decisions were reversed by higher
courts.20 But these courts are not alone in questioning the relation-
ship between marriage and other rights traditionally associated
with that institution.21 For example, the Texas Supreme Court has
greenlighted a lawsuit challenging Houston’s provision of health
insurance to married same-sex couples, refusing to hold that the
right to marry requires the State to “provide the same publicly
14. Id.
15. See id. at 179.
16. See Turner v. Steiner, 398 P.3d 110, 113 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), abrogated by
McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017) (“A man is presumed to be the father of the
child if ... ‘[h]e and the mother of the child were married at any time in the ten months
immediately preceding the birth’ [of] the child.” (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814
(2019)).
17. Id. at 113-14.
18. Id. at 114 (emphasis added).
19. See id. Although most states have adopted statutes that make a husband the father
of a child conceived through the consensual use of donor sperm, Arizona lacks a statute
governing sperm donation. Theoretically, a sperm donor could turn around and sue to estab-
lish paternity, displacing the husband. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-814 (2019).
20. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2077 (2017) (per curiam); McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at
502. Importantly, they were reversed not because of any necessary connection between
marriage and parenthood but because they treated married same- and opposite-sex couples
differently. See Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078; McLaughlin, 401 P.3d at 500. The higher courts left
open the possibility that states could sever marriage and parenthood as long as they did so
evenhandedly. See, e.g., Pavan, 137 S. Ct. at 2078-79 (clarifying that Obergefell proscribes
disparate treatment and concluding that Arkansas had applied its laws unequally).
21. See, e.g., Strickland v. Day, 239 So. 3d 486, 494 (Miss. 2018) (denying parental
presumption to an ex-same-sex spouse on appeal to the Mississippi Supreme Court).
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funded benefits [such as health care] to all married persons.”22 And
various state legislatures have considered bills attempting to take
states out of the marriage business altogether.23
These recent developments may be nothing more than new at-
tempts to discriminate against same-sex couples.24 To be sure,
leading up to Obergefell, some state courts were transparently
motivated by political opposition to same-sex marriage.25 And
scholars have documented the presence of anti-gay animus in
arguments by same-sex marriage opponents.26 Indeed, Justice
Scalia’s claim that “it is not of special importance to me what the
law says about marriage”27 beggars belief given that he devoted a
page in his Lawrence v. Texas dissent to the “fear” that striking
down bans on homosexual sodomy would lead to same-sex marriage
and the “hope” that it would not.28
22. See Pidgeon v. Turner, 538 S.W.3d 73, 78-79, 86-87 (Tex. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.
505 (2017) (declaring that Obergefell did not address or resolve the question of whether
Texas’s Defense of Marriage Act precluded the City of Houston from offering taxpayer-funded
spousal benefits to same-sex couples). 
23. See, e.g., Debbie Elliott, Same-Sex Marriage Flashpoint: Alabama Considers Quitting
the Marriage Business, NPR (Feb. 27, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/27/58883
4254/same-sex-marriage-flashpoint-alabama-considers-getting-out-of-the-marriage-busin
[https://perma.cc/D6NG-H5CS] (describing proposed legislation in Alabama to stop issuing
marriage licenses).
24. See, e.g., Pavan v. Smith: Victory, GLBTQ LEGAL ADVOCATES & DEFS., https://www.
glad.org/cases/pavan-v-smith/ [https://perma.cc/T5QK-7SPA] (“[O]pponents of equality have
not stopped trying to resist [Obergefell], and we have seen attempts across the states to under-
mine what Obergefell so clearly guarantees.”); Texas Supreme Court Distorts Obergefell to
Revive Attacks on Marriages of Same-Sex Couples: Lambda Legal Will Work with Houston
Attorneys to Defend Marriage, LAMBDA LEGAL (June 30, 2017), https://www.lambdalegal.
org/news/tx_20170630_pidgeon-decision [https://perma.cc/2CSB-ZABV] (calling the Texas
Supreme Court decision a “naked attempt” to relegate LGBT people to “second-class status”).
25. See, e.g., Billy Corriher & Eric Lesh, Opinion, Marriage Equality Cases Languish
Before Elected Judges, L.A. TIMES (June 1, 2015, 5:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/
op-ed/la-oe-corriher-lesh-gay-marriage-lawsuits-20150601-story.html [https://perma.cc/64FK-
WZP5].
26. See, e.g., Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Inequality: Same-Sex Relationships, Religious
Exemptions, and the Production of Sexual Orientation Discrimination, 100 CALIF. L. REV.
1169, 1176 (2012) (concluding that anti-marriage arguments were largely motivated by
homophobia rather than legal policy).
27. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2627 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28. 539 U.S. 558, 604-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). For an illuminating analysis of the
emotions motivating the dissenting Justices in Obergefell, see Marc Spindelman, Obergefell’s
Dreams, 77 OHIO ST. L.J. 1039, 1074-76 (2016).
460 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:453
But whether these developments are mere pretext for discrimina-
tion, they raise a deeper question concerning the legal incidents that
should comprise the positive law of marriage. One might attempt to
answer that question in several different ways. So, for example,
scholars have asked whether the Constitution requires the states to
provide a core set of marital rights. Some have taken a historical
approach to that question, looking to the rights that constituted the
positive law of marriage at the time of the nation’s founding.29
Others have made normative constitutional arguments based on
philosophical commitments30 or positivist accounts.31 And going be-
yond questions about marriage law’s constitutional floor, innu-
merable scholars have critiqued various aspects of marriage law for
being inefficient, incoherent, discriminatory, or otherwise problem-
atic.
I respond to the question from a different angle. Starting from the
premise that marriage law consists of a bundle of legal incidents,
the contents of which have continuously changed over time, I ask
what the process of combining or breaking apart reveals about what
should go in that bundle. Numerous courts have used concepts such
as integrity and unity to describe marriage,32 assuming that various
legal incidents belong together.33 Although marital integrity, to this
point, has been mostly an empty vessel, the concept of integrity—
the “state of being complete or undivided”34—is a useful framework
through which to evaluate changes to marriage laws.
29. See, e.g., Michael Boucai, Before Loving: The Origins of the Right to Marry, UTAH L.
REV. (forthcoming 2019) (canvassing early judicial decisions, treatises, and other secondary
sources to collect and distill the core rights associated with marriage from the founding
through the mid-twentieth century).
30. See, e.g., Gregg Strauss, The Positive Right to Marry, 102 VA. L. REV. 1691, 1741
(2016) (arguing that the positive right to marry must match individual freedom to share one’s
life with another person with rules that protect the partners’ equal liberty, which in turn
requires rules governing entrance, exit, and property distribution). 
31. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Let’s Call the Whole Thing Off: Can States Abolish the
Institution of Marriage?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 697, 705-07 (2010) (arguing that the longstanding
regulation of marriage can “harden[ ]” into a liberty interest that states can no longer aban-
don).
32. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600 (referring to marriage as a “unified whole”);
Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (referring to the “integrity of the marriage relation”).
33. See, e.g., Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J.,
concurring) (suggesting that the marital regime of coverture was “founded in the divine
ordinance”).
34. Integrity, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (11th ed. 2003).
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The meaning of integration becomes clear when analyzing the
mechanisms by which the positive law of marriage disintegrates.35
Marriage can integrate or disintegrate along two dimensions. The
first involves marriage’s rights and duties. Borrowing from Thomas
Grey’s suggestion that legal categories disintegrate when their
conceptual, legal, and popular meanings diverge,36 marriage
becomes more integrated when legal rights and social norms work
together to promote marriage’s functions. It disintegrates when
marriage laws undermine each other or the social norms on which
they depend.37 The second dimension concerns the sources of mar-
riage law, namely the states and federal government.38 Marriage
law becomes more integrated when the package of rights is consis-
tent across jurisdictions.39 It disintegrates when different definitions
and rules interfere with its singular meaning.40 Inconsistencies
between state and federal definitions of marriage can result in peo-
ple being simultaneously married and unmarried, interfering with
the experience of marriage as an “integrated whole.”41 Perfectly in-
tegrated—complete and undivided—marriage would coherently
35. See Disintegrate, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, supra note 34 (defining “disintegrate” as “to
break or decompose into constituent elements, parts, or small particles”).
36. See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY: NOMOS XXII 69, 74-
75 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980). 
37. See id.
38. See Janet Halley, Behind the Law of Marriage (I): From Status/Contract to the
Marriage System, 6 UNBOUND: HARV. J. LEGAL LEFT 1, 12-13 (2010).
39. See id. at 44-45.
40. See id. Halley observes that marriage becomes more status-like the more it is
integrated. Id. Although she does not define integration, she provides an example: 
Perhaps the high water mark of integration is ... [one] in which the relationships
between marriages become the web for weaving a fully integrated and stabilized
“social”: in such a world, all marriages would be marriage all the time and
everywhere, and all social life would be linked in some tight way to the
marriages and to marriage.
Id. at 45. Halley conceives of integration as a phenomenon that extends beyond the legal
institution of marriage to the ordering of society—channeling most people into marriage and
filtering experience through the lenses of marriage and nonmarriage. See id. at 46-47. In
contrast, I use the concept to describe the organization of marriage as marriage, that is, how
to appropriately structure marriage to achieve its ends. Moreover, Halley’s definition takes
for granted that marriage is whatever rights are currently bundled into that status. See id.
at 5. In contrast, I argue that the selection of rights that flow from marriage is also central
to the concept of integration.
41. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303 (1942) (noting that the failure of states
to grant full faith and credit to each other’s divorce decrees would cause people to be married
in one state but not in the next, preventing these statuses from being an “integrated whole”).
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implement a set of agreed upon functions uniformly across jurisdic-
tions.
This framework provides the vocabulary to assess changes to
marriage laws—such as disaggregating marriage from parentage or
employment benefits. Although scholars have offered piecemeal
justifications for linking marriage to rights such as parenthood42 or
delinking it from rights such as immigration benefits or federal tax
consequences,43 few have analyzed how those proposals would im-
pact marriage law more broadly.44 Moreover, although scholars have
studied the inconsistencies between state and federal definitions of
marriage,45 they have not analyzed the relationship between those
differences and the optimal bundling of marriage laws. 
Part I of this Article uses the disagreement between the
Obergefell Justices over the inherent legal content of marriage to
highlight deep uncertainties about the very relationship between
law and marriage. It shows that scholars have attempted to answer
questions about the nature of marriage through two binaries—
status versus contract and positive rights versus negative rights—
and explains why those two binaries fail to provide tools to assess
the positive law of marriage. It then shows why an integration
framework could better answer those questions.
42. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, A Case for Integrated Parenthood, in WHAT IS
PARENTHOOD?: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE FAMILY 147 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel
Cere eds., 2013); Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional Status of Marriage, Kinship, and Sexual
Privacy—Balancing the Individual and Social Interests, 81 MICH. L. REV. 463, 517 (1983).
43. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Marriage Fraud, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 31-37 (2012) (dis-
cussing the delinking of marriage from immigration benefits); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love,
Money, and the IRS: Family, Income Sharing, and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS
L.J. 63, 64-65 (1993) (discussing the problems with linking marriage with joint income tax
returns).
44. Several scholars have explored the consequences of abolishing, and therefore com-
pletely disintegrating, the category of legal marriage. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN,
THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
228-30 (1995); NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 5 (2008). These proposals unsurprisingly focus little on the problem
of properly constituting marriage’s positive law.
45. See, e.g., Ann Laquer Estin, Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the
States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267, 269-71 (2009) (discussing how family law is no
longer viewed solely as the province of state governments); Courtney G. Joslin, Federalism
and Family Status, 90 IND. L.J. 787, 788-93 (2015) (arguing that family law is not inherently
local, but that the federal government has long been involved in defining “family status”).
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Part II begins the project of defining integration and disintegra-
tion. It identifies the first axis of integration, rights and norms. The
states and federal government have populated the positive law of
marriage with thousands of laws that turn on marital status.46
Many of those laws, explicitly or implicitly, depend on social norms,
and coexist with those norms in various degrees of harmony.
Marriage becomes more integrated when the laws regulating mar-
riage work to promote the same purposes; it disintegrates when
changes bring about conflict. The same can be said for laws and the
social norms on which they depend. Disintegration can be direct,
such as when a new rule or rationale contradicts an established
goal. The turn away from the marital presumption to a parentage
rule based on biology provides one example, assuming a function of
marriage is to promote the nuclear family.47 More commonly, laws
and social norms are severed indirectly. For example, Supreme
Court decisions striking down statutes disfavoring illegitimate
children did not directly impact the parental rights of spouses.48 Yet
they eased the consequences of having children outside of mar-
riage,49 challenging the previously necessary connections between
marriage, sex, and parentage. 
Part III identifies the second axis of integration, uniformity of
marriage laws across jurisdictions. Marriage laws spring from
different sources. The federal government generally relies on state
definitions of marriage but does not always do so.50 A particularly
egregious example of divergence occurred under the Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA), when a couple could be treated as married
under state law but receive none of the thousands of legal rights and
obligations afforded to married couples under federal law.51 DOMA
is gone, but the federal government continues to rely on its own
definitions of marriage for various purposes, such as the awarding
of immigration or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits.52
46. See supra note 1.
47. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
48. See Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-)Marriage and Parental Rights in the Age
of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2307-08 (2015).
49. See id. at 2299, 2303, 2307-08.
50. But see Joslin, supra note 45, at 789 (explaining that some argue states have the
exclusive right to define marital status).
51. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 43, at 31-37 (providing examples of definitions of
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Disintegration can also occur when the incidents of marriage differ
between states, either because of different eligibility requirements—
for example, regarding first cousin marriages53—or because of dif-
ferently defined legal obligations—for example, interspousal tort
immunity.54 Because of these differences, a marriage might flicker
on and off and the legal duties between the spouses might change
as a couple drives from state to state.
Having identified the mechanisms of integration and disintegra-
tion, Part IV provides a normative framework for assessing their
benefits and drawbacks. Integration promotes the consistent appli-
cation of laws. Consistency brings about predictability and stability.
It also reduces the information costs associated with those functions
by imposing a numerus clausus of marriage, limiting the number
of standard forms to clarify entitlements and reduce information
costs.55 This makes it easier for people to understand the legal con-
sequences of a choice to marry.56 But these beneficial aspects of
integration must be weighed against the risks: namely, the imposi-
tion of majoritarian preferences and the concomitant contraction of
private choice.57
Focusing on the question of integration casts marriage in a new
light, revealing new contours. Part V identifies two examples, one
involving marriage laws, and one outside of it. The first discusses
whether to extend the marital presumption to same-sex couples or
to abandon it in favor of other routes to legal parenthood. The
second discusses whether states should recognize nonmarital re-
lationships. In both instances, the lens of integration reveals a
different set of considerations on both sides of the debate than are
marriage from immigration law).
53. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 104 P.3d 857, 858-59 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
54. See Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity in America, 23 GA. L. REV. 359, 359, 435
(1989) (explaining that interspousal tort immunity now only exists in a minority of states).
55. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4-9 (2000). Although family law
scholars have explored the importance of social norms in governing intimate conduct, see infra
notes 125-43 and accompanying text, they have not explored the extent to which a plurality
of relationship forms could affect the efficient functioning of these norms.
56. See Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Choosing Marriage, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1999, 2026-
30 (2017).
57. Cf. Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, A Right Not to Marry, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1509, 1542
(2016) (emphasizing the importance of being able to choose not to marry, as well as to marry).
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typically raised, expanding the discussion of how they should be
resolved.
I. CONSTITUTING MARRIAGE
Courts have frequently assumed that marriage has an inherent
legal content. This has been true even in the face of significant
changes to the positive law of marriage. As numerous scholars have
observed, at the time of our nation’s founding, marriage depended
upon—and indeed produced—gender differentiation.58 The regime
of coverture, tort, contract, property, and criminal law collectively
reinforced the wife’s inferior legal status by denying the wife’s
separate legal existence and concentrating legal decision-making
authority in the husband.59 Many of the changes to the law of mar-
riage in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries have been in
furtherance of dismantling coverture.60 Yet throughout, courts have
continued to speak of marriage laws as a singular thing.61
In 1872, Myra Bradwell, a married woman, challenged the Illinois
Supreme Court’s denial of her petition for admission to the state
bar.62 The United States Supreme Court was unsympathetic to her
case.63 In a now infamous pronouncement, Justice Bradley stated
that “[t]he paramount destiny and mission of woman are to fulfil
the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.”64 Marriage was
central to his opinion.65 Justice Bradley argued that the “constitu-
tion of the family organization”—marriage—was “founded in the
58. NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 3 (2000)
(“Molding individuals’ self-understanding, opportunities, and constraints, marriage uniquely
and powerfully influences the way differences between the sexes are conveyed and symbol-
ized.... The whole system of attribution and meaning that we call gender relies on and to a
great extent derives from the structuring provided by marriage.”).
59. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning
Wives’ Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994); Allison Anna Tait, The
Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married Woman’s Separate Estate, 26
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014).
60. See Tait, supra note 59, at 167, 211-14.
61. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
62. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 131-33 (1873).
63. See id. at 139.
64. Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring).
65. See id. at 140-42.
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divine ordinance, as well as in the nature of things.”66 This “natural”
and “fixed” meaning of marriage could not accommodate a married
woman “adopting a distinct and independent career from that of her
husband.”67 
This assumption that marriage has a core legal meaning echoes
through the centuries. It arose in Estin v. Estin, when the Court
said, “Marital status involves the regularity and integrity of the
marital relation. It affects the legitimacy of the offspring of mar-
riage. It is the basis of criminal laws.”68 And again in Griswold v.
Connecticut, when the Court declared, “Marriage is a coming
together for better or worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of
life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.”69 And most recently in
Obergefell v. Hodges, when the Court identified “essential attributes
of [the right to marry] based in history, tradition, and other consti-
tutional liberties inherent in this intimate bond.”70 Indeed, the
Obergefell majority opinion assumed that same-sex marriage oppo-
nents and advocates agreed in most respects on the meaning of this
“timeless institution,” with gender differentiation being the one
sticking point.71
These pronouncements about marriage’s essential attributes were
suspect the moment they were uttered. For instance, by the time of
Bradwell v. Illinois, some states had begun to extend property
rights to married women.72 Justice Bradley made his claims about
the marriage being “founded in the divine ordinance” and “nature
of things” even as he acknowledged “recent modifications of this civil
status.”73 Moreover, he relied on the disabling effects of coverture on
a married woman lawyer’s ability to enter into binding legal
agreements with her clients to justify the outcome of the case, even
as he recognized that not all women were married and therefore
66. Id. at 141.
67. Id. 
68. 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (emphasis added).
69. 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (emphasis added).
70. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015) (emphasis added).
71. Id. at 2594 (“Far from seeking to devalue marriage, the petitioners seek it for
themselves because of their respect—and need—for its privileges and responsibilities.”).
72. See Siegel, supra note 59, at 1177.
73. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
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subject to the same disabilities.74 Likewise, the notion in Griswold
that marriage is a “coming together for better or for worse, hopefully
enduring,”75 was belied by the widespread availability of divorce,
including by the author of the opinion, Justice Douglas, who was by
then twice divorced.76
It was not until Obergefell, however, that the nature of marriage
became the subject of open dispute. In Justice Kennedy’s majority
opinion, marriage has inherent content, both in terms of expressive
rights and material benefits.77 Marriage has changed over time78 but
it has retained certain “essential attributes,”79 some of which Justice
Kennedy identifies. Marriage is a relationship defined by the part-
ners’ commitment.80 It is permanent: “It offers the hope of compan-
ionship and understanding and assurance that while both still live
there will be someone to care for the other.”81 It also anchors the
family, part of a “unified whole” of rights including the right to “es-
tablish a home and bring up children.”82 The importance of marriage
makes the decision to marry “among the most intimate that an
individual can make,”83 so much so that it “shape[s] an individual’s
destiny.”84 Marriage involves social recognition and respect—“so-
ciety pledge[s] to support the couple”85 and recognizes their “nobility
and dignity.”86
For Justice Kennedy, the law is no passive participant in consti-
tuting marriage. States have placed marriage at the center of the
74. See id.
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
76. See David J. Garrow, The Tragedy of William O. Douglas, NATION (Mar. 27, 2003),
https://www.thenation.com/article/tragedy-william-o-douglas/ [https://perma.cc/HY9E-ZK45].
77. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 2081, 2083-84 (2005)
(arguing that marriage “has two characteristics: the expressive legitimacy that comes from
the public institution of marriage; and the panoply of material benefits, both economic and
non-economic, that the marital relationship confers”).
78. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2595 (2015).
79. Id. at 2598.
80. Id. at 2600 (citing United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 763-64 (2013)) (noting that
a married couple “define themselves by their commitment to each other”).
81. Id. (claiming that marriage affords “permanency and stability”); id. at 2608
(“[M]arriage embodies a love that may endure even past death.” (emphasis added)).
82. Id. at 2600 (citation and quotation marks omitted).
83. Id. at 2599.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2601.
86. Id. at 2594; see also id. at 2600.
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legal and social order by making marital status the key to regula-
tions regarding 
taxation; inheritance and property rights; rules of intestate
succession; spousal privilege in the law of evidence; hospital
access; medical decisionmaking authority; adoption rights; the
rights and benefits of survivors; birth and death certificates;
professional ethics rules; campaign finance restrictions; workers’
compensation benefits; health insurance; and child custody,
support, and visitation rules.87
States only have the “general” authority to vary these rights.88 That
is, because one of marriage’s “profound benefits” is to provide a
recognizable “legal structure” that allows members to “understand
the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with
other families in their community and in their daily lives.”89 This
language implies that many of the current legal rules regarding
marriage are part and parcel of the fundamental right to marry.
In contrast, three dissenting Justices downplay the role of law in
constituting marriage. First, they argue that the right to marry is
purely a negative right.90 Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, acknowledges that the State has, as a positive
matter, enacted laws to channel people into a state-sanctioned
sexual relationship.91 Yet he contends that none of the legal rights
serving as an inducement for couples to enter marriages are con-
stitutionally compelled.92 He criticizes the plaintiffs for attempting
to use the Constitution as a “sword to demand positive entitlements
from the State,” and suggests that the Constitution cannot confer
“public recognition” or “corresponding government benefits.”93 As
Justice Thomas adds in his separate dissenting opinion, the
constitutional right to marry would only come into play if states
87. Id. at 2601.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 2600 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013)).
90. See id. at 2635 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 2613 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[B]y bestowing a respected status and material
benefits on married couples, society encourages men and women to conduct sexual relations
within marriage rather than without.”).
92. See id.
93. Id. at 2620.
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interfered with the private acts of “making vows, holding religious
ceremonies celebrating those vows, raising children, and otherwise
enjoying the society of one’s spouse.”94
Second, the dissenting Justices question the relationship between
the legal regulation of marriage and marriage’s “core meaning.”95
Like Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Roberts agrees with the
assumption that marriage has a “singular understanding”96 or “core
meaning,”97 albeit one revolving around the procreative union of one
man and one woman.98 Yet, by denying a relationship between the
constitutional right to marry and positive marriage law, he makes
clear that the “core meaning” is social as opposed to legal.99 Justice
Scalia’s remark that “[t]he law can recognize as marriage whatever
sexual attachments and living arrangements it wishes,” the
consequences of which would be “no more adverse than the effects
of many other controversial laws,”100 emphasizes this point: there is
nothing special about the laws regulating marriage.
The integral aspects of legal marriage—once assumed by the
courts—are now openly being questioned. Although courts have
failed to explain why certain legal incidents make up marriage’s
core, scholars have attempted to answer this question by employing
two binaries. First, is marriage a status or contract?101 Second, does
the right to marry have a positive dimension, or is it merely what-
ever collection of rights the state deigns to provide?102 In other
words, is the set of laws known as “marriage” constitutionally com-
pelled, or are states free to alter or even abolish it?103
94. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., dissenting); cf. Christopher R. Leslie, Dissenting from History:
The False Narratives of the Obergefell Dissents, 92 IND. L.J. 1007, 1045-46 (2017) (noting as
a historical matter that individuals faced adverse legal consequences for performing or
participating in purely religious same-sex wedding ceremonies).
95. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2615 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 2613.
97. Id. at 2615.
98. See id. at 2613.
99. See id. at 2613-15.
100. Id. at 2626-27 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
1, 6 (2011).
102. See Sunstein, supra note 77, at 2083-84 (“The right to marry, then, comprises a right
of access to the expressive and material benefits that the state affords to the institution of
marriage.” (emphasis added)).
103. See id. In the years leading up to Obergefell, several influential scholars concluded
that the Due Process Clause protected only negative liberties such as intimacy rather than
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The status/contract inquiry focuses on the extent to which in-
dividuals can customize the state-provided package of laws ac-
companying the entrance into marriage. In Maynard v. Hill, the
Supreme Court endorsed a decidedly status-based view, observing
that
whil[e] marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions
of courts [as] a civil contract—generally to indicate that it must
be founded upon the agreement of the parties ... it is something
more than a mere contract. The consent of the parties is of
course essential to its existence, but when the contract to marry
is executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be
modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the
consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once
formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to various
obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the mainte-
nance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for it
is the foundation of the family and of society, without which
there would be neither civilization nor progress.104
a particular set of rights associated with marriage. See Patricia A. Cain, Imagine There’s No
Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27, 60 (1996); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 2094 (contending
that fundamental rights “do not require affirmative provision by the state”); Nelson Tebbe &
Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1378 (2010).
Thus, states might be compelled to offer access to marriage on equal terms to similarly
situated couples but they would remain free to eliminate marital rights altogether. See Cain,
supra, at 52-54 (arguing that “all committed couples should be equally benefited”); Sunstein,
supra note 77, at 2095-96 (arguing that while the state would not be required to provide an
official scheme for recognizing marriages, it would not be able to prevent people from entering
into relationships they consider to be marriages); Tebbe & Widiss, supra, at 1378 (“[S]tates
could almost certainly get out of the marriage business altogether.”). A minority of scholars
have argued that the right to marry is a positive one. See Carlos A. Ball, The Positive in the
Fundamental Right to Marry: Same-Sex Marriage in the Aftermath of Lawrence v. Texas, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1184, 1202-03 (2004) (arguing that the line of cases culminating in Turner v.
Safley, which recognized the importance of community and legal support for the partners’
private commitment, show that “the state [cannot] be indifferent toward at least some
intimate relationships”); Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 667, 686-
88 (2010) (suggesting limits on the state’s power to abolish marriage entirely but expressing
skepticism that states must provide material or expressive benefits to married couples);
Strauss, supra note 30, at 1741-42 (arguing that the law plays a critical role in facilitating
shared spousal authority necessary to protect the couple’s equal liberty within an intimate
relationship).
104. 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888).
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In the last century, however, divorce reform and a partial turn
toward marital contracting have given individuals more control over
the legal consequences of their marriage, moving it along the
spectrum toward contract. The consensus view is that marriage has
become more contractual, “[b]ut everyone tacitly agrees that it can
never go all the way, because some aspects of marriage are ineradi-
cably different from ordinary contracts.”105 The question that re-
mains is which aspects of marriage should form that fixed core.106
Whether marriage has a fixed core also featured prominently in
the more recent debate over whether marriage is a negative or
positive right. The judicial campaign to constitutionalize same-sex
marriage prompted scholars to ask what exactly the right to marry
entails. Many prominent scholars conclude that the Due Process
Clause protects only negative liberties such as sexual intimacy
rather than the combination of laws currently associated with mar-
riage.107 Thus, states might be compelled to offer same-sex couples
access to marriage on equal terms to opposite-sex couples, but they
would remain free to eliminate marital rights altogether.108 Other
scholars argue that the Due Process Clause confers a positive right
to marry, requiring the state to affirmatively provide core marriage
rights.109 These scholars, however, attempt at most a rough sketch
105. See Halley, supra note 38, at 2.
106. States have seemed much more willing to allow spouses to alter the economic-related
aspects of the marital relationship than the noneconomic aspects. See Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 65, 123 (1998).
107. See Cain, supra note 103, at 30, 38-42 (arguing that “substantive due process is not
violated if marriage is abolished”); Sunstein, supra note 77, at 2094 (contending that
fundamental rights “do not require affirmative provision by the state”); Tebbe & Widiss, supra
note 103, at 1378 (arguing that there may not be a due process right to civil marriage).
108. See Cain, supra note 103, at 40-43; Sunstein, supra note 77, at 2095-96 (arguing that
while the state would not be required to provide an official scheme for recognizing marriages,
it would not be able to prevent people from entering into relationships they consider to be
marriages); Tebbe & Widiss, supra note 103, at 1378 (“[S]tates could almost certainly get out
of the marriage business altogether.”).
109. See Ball, supra note 103, at 1202-03 (arguing that the line of cases culminating in
Turner v. Safley, which recognized the importance of community and legal support for the
partners’ private commitment, show that “the state [cannot] be indifferent toward at least
some intimate relationships”); Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 686-88 (suggesting limits on the
state’s power to abolish marriage entirely but expressing skepticism that states must provide
material or expressive benefits to married couples); Strauss, supra note 30, at 1741-42
(arguing that the law plays a critical role in facilitating shared spousal authority necessary
to protect the couple’s equal liberty within an intimate relationship).
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of which existing marriage laws comprise the positive right to
marry.110
Both binaries, therefore, beg the question how to determine the
rights and duties that constitute marriage’s positive law. While
status and contract are helpful ways for thinking about marriage,
the binary does not shed light on what aspects of marriage should
be treated as status-like, or beyond the power of individuals to
change. Nor, from a positive perspective, does it explain which
rights to include in the marital bundle. The positive/negative right
debate also provides little guidance regarding the law of marriage.
Even if marriage is a negative right, states have seen fit to regulate
it.111 And if legal marriage has a positive dimension, that fact would
only answer questions about the constitutional baseline of rights
rather than the optimal bundle.112
The conflicting Obergefell opinions, therefore, illuminate an im-
portant question that has escaped sustained attention. The state
has, as a positive matter, made marriage the gateway to many dif-
ferent legal rights.113 Although scholars have questioned piecemeal
whether certain rights should turn on marital status114 and have
challenged the denial of these rights to unmarried couples,115 they
have paid less attention to the normative justifications for bundling
rights in a single institution. What rights should accompany the
entrance into marriage, and what principles should guide the inte-
gration of those rights into the status of marriage?
II. INTEGRITY OF LAWS AND NORMS
As the previous Part demonstrates, there is no consensus,
intellectually or historically, about the fundamental purposes or
110. Professor Strauss comes the closest to tackling this challenge. He argues that states
must provide formalities indicating the creation of a marriage, Strauss, supra note 30, at
1752, a rule against interference in an ongoing marriage, id. at 1753-54, and rules creating
equitable remedies at divorce, id. at 1756-60.
111. See Silbaugh, supra note 106, at 113.
112. See generally Strauss, supra note 30 (focusing on the existence of a positive right to
marry, rather than focusing on the specific bundle of rights included).
113. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015).
114. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., CYNTHIA GRANT BOWMAN, UNMARRIED COUPLES, LAW, AND PUBLIC POLICY 11-
12, 95, 222-23 (2010); POLIKOFF, supra note 44, at 1123-26.
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meaning of marriage. Some scholars argue that marriage has
changed over time from a relationship primarily fulfilling economic
and political needs to one about love;116 or from a relationship rooted
in the gendered nature of things to one based on autonomy and per-
sonal fulfillment.117 Others defend the view that its primary purpose
is to “unite the biological, social and legal components of parenthood
into one lasting bond.”118 The former view of marriage prevailed in
Obergefell, with the Court rejecting the view that marriage “is by its
nature a gender-differentiated union” in favor of egalitarianism and
autonomy.119 But resistance to the decision, including from the
Court’s second-newest Justice, suggests that the debate rages on.120
Consensus around a hierarchy of purposes that marriage should
serve would go a long way toward crafting perfectly coherent mar-
riage laws. Hypothetically, we would all agree that the laws should
first promote economic interdependency; next enable emotional
support; and so on.121 Without this consensus, the desirability of
particular marriage laws will always be the subject of debate. Yet
such consensus is not necessary to begin to analyze whether
marriage is optimally integrated. That is because integration is
fundamentally an inquiry about how well legal rules are serving the
claimed purposes marriage should perform. Whatever the purposes,
116. See, e.g., STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: FROM OBEDIENCE TO INTIMACY OR
HOW LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 5-9 (2005).
117. See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisenstadt and
Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1519 (1994) (charting the progression from marriage laws justified
by the natural inferiority of women and children to laws premised on the consensual union
of two autonomous individuals); see also Leslie, supra note 94, at 1015-17 (arguing that the
gendered view of marriage gave way to a more egalitarian view).
118. David Blankenhorn, How My View on Gay Marriage Changed, N.Y. TIMES (June 22,
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/23/opinion/how-my-view-on-gay-marriage-changed.
html [https://perma.cc/4NHY-PECG].
119. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2594-96 (2015); see also Clare Huntington,
Obergefell’s Conservatism: Reifying Familial Fronts, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 23, 25-26 (2015)
(arguing that the majority opinion unnecessarily chose one meaning or “social front” of mar-
riage over another).
120. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2079 (2017) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (arguing,
with regard to same-sex parents being listed on a child’s birth certificate, that “nothing in
Obergefell indicates that a birth registration regime based on biology ... offends the
Constitution”). The retirement of Justice Kennedy leaves Obergefell on even shakier ground.
121. This is not to suggest that these ends of marriage policy do not exist in tension. See
Emily J. Stolzenberg, The New Family Freedom, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1983, 1987 (2018) (identifying
an intractable tension between the goals of promoting individual autonomy and privatizing
dependency).
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they form the baseline for assessing the desirability of changes to
marriage laws and whether those changes will promote the integrity
of marriage or its opposite. For instance, laws can incentivize wives
to join the workforce or to remain in the home;122 a law producing
the first consequence would be undesirable to a legislator holding
the view that marriage should reproduce the “natural” order in
which women perform domestic labor and men participate in the
workforce. Analyzing integration has the salutary consequence of
flushing out one’s hierarchy of purposes, whatever they may be.
Once one articulates marriage’s purposes, it is possible to analyze
whether the array of legal rules produces the optimal outcome. This
inquiry analyzes the relationship between laws and the social norms
upon which the laws depend. This Part provides a framework for
understanding the relationship between laws and norms.123 It then
demonstrates how specific changes to marriage laws can bring about
integration and disintegration.124
A. The Relationship Between Laws and Norms
As a relationship regulated loosely by open-ended duties,125 mar-
riage is heavily dependent on social norms,126 “social regularities
that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized
sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or
both.”127 Eric Posner has argued that “[t]he law is always imposed
122. See David L. Chambers, What If? The Legal Consequences of Marriage and the Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 473 (1996).
123. See infra Part II.A.
124. See infra Part II.B.
125. See Strauss, supra note 30, at 1741.
126. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 68-69 (2000); see also id. at 34 (defining
“social norms” as “behavioral regularities that occur in equilibrium when people use signals
to show that they belong to the good type” of community member); Solangel Maldonado,
Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA. L. REV.
921, 928 (2005) (studying social norms in the family context); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms
and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1907 (2000) (“Marriage is a status
in which a couple, usually through a formal ceremony, agrees to be subject to a complex set
of behavioral expectations defining the roles of spouse and parent, expectations that will
restrict their freedom and guide their behavior in the relationship.”).
127. Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH.
L. REV. 338, 340 (1997). Scholars have observed that although these norms are not necessarily
spelled out in statutes, they can be communicated by courts at the end of relationships, or
when those outside of marriage attempt to benefit from laws governing marriage. See, e.g.,
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against a background stream of nonlegal regulation—enforced by
gossip, disapproval, ostracism, and violence—which itself produces
important collective goods.”128
Social norms can give substance to broad legal commandments
that would be tricky to legislate with more specificity. Take for
instance California’s statutorily imposed spousal “obligations of
mutual respect, fidelity, and support.”129 Specific commitments may
be reflected in norms encouraging spouses to “avoid extramarital
sex; to share financial resources, household tasks, time, and private
thoughts; to keep family secrets, to support each other in sickness
and adversity; to remember anniversaries and birthdays; and to
forgive and forget hurt feelings and arguments.”130 
These norms function in different ways. Some norms police the
boundaries of the relationship. Sexual fidelity is enforced by commu-
nity disapproval of extramarital relationships, which in turn encour-
ages spousal and community oversight.131 Other norms strengthen
the relationship from within by encouraging commitment on both a
practical and emotional level. Spouses are expected to subordinate
self-interest in favor of the marital unit: the mutual agreement to
act cooperatively and stop indulging in selfish impulses elevates the
partnership over separate goals.132 Moreover, spouses are not only
expected to act as partners but to be emotionally intimate.133
Couples who choose to marry commonly believe that love is a pre-
requisite for a happy life together.134 And norms instruct that love
Albertina Antognini, The Law of Nonmarriage, 58 B.C. L. REV. 1, 6 (2017) (exploring non-
marital couples’ relationship with the law).
128. POSNER, supra note 126, at 4.
129. CAL. FAM. CODE § 720 (West 2015).
130. Scott, supra note 126, at 1910 n.17; see also Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for
Social Policy, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 326 (2004) (arguing that social norms are often
embodied in a couple’s marriage vows).
131. See Elizabeth S. Scott, A World Without Marriage, 41 FAM. L.Q. 537, 563 (2007).
132. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1909; Lynn D. Wardle, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Conundrum, 1991 BYU L. REV. 79, 122 (“Self-sacrifice, sharing, continuous giving, and contin-
ual forgiving are indispensable to any happy marriage.”). Other scholars caution that
although altruism is an important part of the meaning of marriage, “constant self-denial[ ]
is anathema to true altruism.” Carolyn J. Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage,
104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 85 (2004).
133. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1910 n.17.
134. See COONTZ, supra note 116, at 5; see also RENATA GROSSI, LOOKING FOR LOVE IN THE
LEGAL DISCOURSE OF MARRIAGE 29 (2014) (“One of the motifs, if not the central motif of
marriage in the west in the twenty-first century is romantic love.”); Hamilton, supra note 130,
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is the most important part of a marriage.135 Couples therefore work
to enrich their relationship and censure lying or keeping secrets.136
Moreover, communication of personal details reinforces the commit-
ment to behave within the boundaries of the marriage by creating
vulnerability for each party in the event of relationship break-
down.137
Many scholars believe that the law plays a role in strengthening
the norms on which it depends.138 Richard McAdams has argued
that the law may strengthen a norm’s enforcement power by ex-
pressing the community’s adherence to the norm, which happens in
two ways: first, by publicizing a social consensus, and second, by
providing concrete norms that define compliance with broader, ab-
stract norms.139 The existence of the law or the legislative process
leading to its enactment educates the community about the societal
consensus regarding a particular behavior.140 The law may also
provide specific obligations to give substance to abstract norms. For
example, Elizabeth Scott has observed that “parents are subject to
an abstract commitment norm encouraging them to educate their
children and prepare them to be productive citizens.”141 Compulsory
school attendance statutes “defined one requirement for complying
with the norm” and imposed legal penalties on parents who failed
to comply.142 Scott contends that parents have since “internalized
the legal requirement as establishing a baseline of what good
parenting require[s].”143
at 328 (describing marriage as a public expression of love); Gregg Strauss, Why the State
Cannot “Abolish Marriage”: A Partial Defense of Legal Marriage, 90 IND. L.J. 1261, 1304
(2015) (explaining that the recent Western conception of marriage based on love is now
pervasive).
135. Frantz & Dagan, supra note 132, at 84. 
136. See COONTZ, supra note 116, at 278.
137. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1911.
138. See, e.g., McAdams, supra note 127, at 391-92 (arguing that laws “shape or regulate
norms”); Scott, supra note 126, at 1905 (“Although the relative impact of law and norms in
shaping expectations about marital behavior cannot be quantified, it is uncontroversial that
the institution of normative marriage is defined in important ways by its legal framework.”).
139. McAdams, supra note 127, at 399-400; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive
Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2031 (1996) (noting the (aspirational) use of legal
change to “reconstruct existing norms and to change the social meaning of action”).
140. See McAdams, supra note 127, at 400-03.
141. Scott, supra note 126, at 1927.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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Stable norms enable people “to go about their lives without hav-
ing to question their actions or the actions of others.”144 But these
norms can also become weakened, or deinstitutionalized.145 Without
these norms, “individuals can no longer rely on shared understand-
ings of how to act,” resulting in increased negotiation and conflict.146
Laws can create or bolster social norms, but they can also de-
institutionalize them, either by contradicting norms or by eliminat-
ing legal rules that support them.147 First, the law can express a
message that contradicts a previously established norm, undermin-
ing the uniformity of consensus around that norm.148 Laws making
divorce easier may express the view that marriage need not be a
lasting commitment, contradicting the social norm that marriage
should be a permanent relationship.149 Second, those changes can
eliminate the concrete norms that define compliance with the ab-
stract norm.150 For example, Scott has argued that divorce reform
undermined the norm of marital commitment by eliminating tra-
ditional fault grounds—such as adultery—without replacing those
concrete rules.151 Without substitute rules, spouses lack guidelines
describing “specific behavioral expectations. [F]or example, ... what
effort must be expended before declaring that the relationship has
truly failed?”152 Even if the community were still interested in
policing the commitment norm, the lack of concrete expectations
would pose an obstacle.
Both these types of legal change can undermine the enforce-
ment mechanisms on which the norm depends. McAdams has ar-
gued that the enforcement of a norm increases when a secondary
consensus develops that “those who expressly approve, or fail to
disapprove, of the perpetrators of [the primary norm themselves]
144. Andrew J. Cherlin, The Deinstitutionalization of American Marriage, 66 J. MARRIAGE
& FAM. 848, 848 (2004).
145. See id.
146. Id.
147. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1952 (discussing how no-fault divorce changed norms);
see also supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
148. See, e.g., supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
149. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1952. Scholars of the relationship between law and norms
have attempted to draw a connection between the law’s expressive function and social norms.
150. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
151. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1952.
152. Id.
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merit disapproval;”153 when, in other words, those who fail to shun
are themselves shunned.154 The erosion of what McAdams calls a
“secondary enforcement norm”155 explains how the rise of divorce
coexists with the resilient marital norm of relationship permanence
and commitment:156 people have continued to hold the primary norm
while simultaneously failing to police the secondary enforcement
norm of shunning their divorced community members.157 The con-
sequence of legal changes has been to weaken the enforcement
mechanisms of such norms. This weakening then dilutes the signal
that wedding vows can send about the permanence of the relation-
ship.158
An important qualification to the foregoing analysis is that social
norms are not always uniform, and, even when they are, they do not
necessarily control behavior. For instance, norms can vary between
subcultures. As Katherine Franke has shown, lesbians and gay men
have long formed families outside the traditional marital dyad,
showing a willingness to parent children in broader social networks
with less expectation of exclusivity or control.159 And as Martha
Nussbaum has shown, even deeply entrenched norms, such as
monogamous marriage, do not always control behavior; historical-
ly, many individuals dissatisfied with their relationships “simply
moved away and started life somewhere else.”160 Thus, “many if not
153. McAdams, supra note 127, at 372.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. See Stephanie Ellen Byrd, The Social Construction of Marital Commitment, 71 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 318, 325 (2009) (“Marital commitment was conceived of not only as a value-
laden status, but also as a status that must be achieved.”); see supra note 81 and
accompanying text (documenting how people continue to believe that marriage should be a
permanent relationship). See generally Denise Previti & Paul R. Amato, Why Stay Married?
Rewards, Barriers, and Marital Stability, 65 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 561, 566 (2003) (explaining
various aspects that contribute to marital cohesion including upholding the norm of marital
permanence).
157. See, e.g., Do You Think Getting a Divorce Is Morally Acceptable, or Morally Wrong?,
STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/218524/americans-moral-stance-towards-divor
ce/ [https://perma.cc/5QWE-VGLW] (demonstrating 76 percent of Americans regarded divorce
as morally acceptable in 2018); Andrew Dugan, U.S. Divorce Rate Dips, but Moral Accept-
ability Hits New High, GALLUP (July 7, 2017), http://news.gallup.com/poll/213677/divorce-rate-
dips-moral-acceptability-hits-new-high.aspx [https://perma.cc/NJG5-2V98] (demonstrating 73
percent of Americans say divorce is morally acceptable).
158. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1955.
159. KATHERINE FRANKE, WEDLOCKED: THE PERILS OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 97 (2015).
160. Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 675.
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most broken marriages were not formally terminated” before remar-
riage.161 Norms, as well as the laws on the books, may diverge from
how people structure their lives.162 That being said, the basic points
here seem uncontroversial, namely, that the law depends upon
norms and can impact and be impacted by—even if nonexclusively—
the development of those norms.
B. Mechanisms of Legal Integration and Disintegration 
Every change to marriage’s positive law—through addition,
deletion, or revision—affects the ability of the body of law to achieve
its intended purposes. And marriage laws have changed signifi-
cantly over time. Legal reforms beginning in the late nineteenth
century and accelerating in the second half of the twentieth century
have largely—but incompletely—shed the vestiges of coverture,163
often making laws gender-neutral and sometimes eliminating them
altogether.164 At the same time, states and the federal government
have made an increasing number of laws turn on marital status.165
The legal regulation of marriage is, therefore, as thick as it ever has
been.
These legal changes reveal the ways in which marriage law inte-
grates or disintegrates. The most straightforward way that mar-
riage can disintegrate is when the state eliminates a law that serves
marriage’s intended purpose or implements a law contradicting it.166
Similarly, the state could eliminate a law supporting an important
social norm, or could implement a law contradicting it.167 By failing
to extend the law as far as it might go, or contradicting other laws
161. Id.
162. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1966-67 (noting that people may pay lip service to certain
norms while preferring to disregard them). For instance, a recent study found that the
Obergefell decision changed people’s perception of social norms around the acceptability of
same-sex marriage, making them more likely to conclude that society favors same-sex
marriage, while simultaneously failing to change the participants’ personal attitudes about
same-sex marriage or gay people. See Margaret E. Tankard & Elizabeth Levy Paluck, The
Effect of a Supreme Court Decision Regarding Gay Marriage on Social Norms and Personal
Attitudes, 28 PSYCHOL. SCI. 1334, 1339 (2017).
163. See Dolgin, supra note 117, at 1534-35.
164. See, e.g., Tait, supra note 59, at 167, 211-14 (discussing dismantling coverture).
165. See supra note 1.
166. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
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or norms, these changes would have the effect of making marriage
law less internally consistent—less of a unified whole. In contrast,
the state could implement a law fully consistent with other laws in
achieving marriage’s desired ends, making marriage even more
complete.
Changes to the law of interspousal immunity provide a good
example of the mechanisms of integration and disintegration. At
common law, wives were not allowed to bring tort claims against
their husbands.168 Courts reasoned that allowing wives to bring
torts such as battery—for conduct such as domestic abuse—would
undermine domestic harmony.169 Most states have since abolished
the doctrine of interspousal immunity, allowing such suits to
proceed.170 If one understands marriage as a loving union between
two autonomous individuals, this development makes marriage
more integrated, treating both spouses as individuals and giving
women equal standing within a marriage.171 If, however, one ad-
heres to a gender-differentiated view of marriage that depends on
wives being submissive to their husbands,172 this legal change would
have the opposite effect. Between these opposing views, the view
that marriage should be an equal partnership is clearly dominant,
meaning that, for most people, this change brings about greater
integration.173
Sometimes, however, legal changes can bring multiple well-
accepted goals into conflict. One example is the adoption of rules
allowing spouses to contract around marital property laws. Even
after the adoption of gender-neutral marital property laws, the law
historically forbade spouses from entering into binding contracts
regarding their property.174 Marital property laws were therefore
168. See JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 64 (2011).
169. See id. (citing Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 618 (1910)); see also Leslie, supra
note 94, at 1016-17.
170. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 168, at 65.
171. See id.
172. See Christopher R. Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage Laws and
Heightened Scrutiny, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 1077, 1120 (2014) (noting that a goal of the doctrine
was to keep wives dependent on their husbands).
173. See GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 168, at 65 (“The master trend of the law ... has
gone to redefine marriage as the coming together of two distinct individuals” who “keep their
identities before, during, and after the marriage.”).
174. See Brian Bix, Bargaining in the Shadow of Love: The Enforcement of Premarital
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mandatory, forcing spouses into a financial partnership. When
states adopted rules enforcing premarital and marital agreements,
the spouses could contract around those property rules, transform-
ing them into defaults.175 Now, a couple can marry without creating
any marital property or support obligations, effectively severing
marriage from its property consequences. Allowing spouses to
contract arguably treats them as equal individuals and is consistent
with legal developments that have allowed wives to hold property
and work outside the home,176 but it conflicts with the promotion of
mutual support and dependency. The more important the goal of
imposing support obligations on spouses, the more this legal change
represents disintegration instead of integration.177
The impacts of legal change may operate more or less directly on
other marriage laws. The elimination of laws surrounding but not
directly regulating marriage can indirectly affect marital rights. The
liberalization of divorce laws transformed marriage from a perma-
nent relation178 to one that the parties could exit by choice.179 Laws
affecting the availability of divorce did not necessarily change legal
rules regarding spousal duties, property, and parentage. For
instance, before the legalization of no-fault divorce, just as after,
spouses in California owned an undivided one-half interest in com-
munity property.180 But making divorce readily available increased
the salience of marital property because property division became
less of an abstract proposition and more of a reality.181 The same can
be said of other marital rights and duties, such as spousal rights
Agreements and How We Think About Marriage, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 145, 150 (1998).
175. See id. at 151.
176. Cf. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, 76 MD. L. REV. 55, 109-10 (2016)
(noting that the ability of women to participate in the labor market has undermined the
assumption that men must be responsible for women).
177. Cf. Stolzenberg, supra note 121, at 1994-95 (examining the importance of privatizing
dependency to family law policy).
178. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 1373, 1387 (2000) (“A husband and wife could not simply agree to end their
relationship. Marriages terminated at the death of one party or at divorce, which was only
available for fault ... and difficult to obtain even then.”).
179. See Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L.
REV. 291, 298-99 (1987) (noting the new importance of granting divorces based on mutual
consent).
180. Id. at 293-94.
181. See id. at 300-01 (discussing how community property was generally divided equally
among divorcing spouses).
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against mismanagement of the marital property and support obli-
gations.182 Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen in the explosion
of analyses of the distributional consequences of divorce beginning
in the 1970s and 1980s.183
Relatedly, legal changes can undermine social norms. One of the
leading arguments by opponents of same-sex marriage was that
allowing same-sex couples to marry would disintegrate marriage by
severing parenthood from marriage. Sexual complementarity was
seen as a linchpin of marriage, without which things would fall
apart; the center would no longer hold. This argument started from
the premise that marriage and parenthood should be integrated
because marriage is the natural184 or optimal environment in which
to raise children, and that children experience poorer outcomes
when their parents are not married.185 To redefine marriage as a
relationship based on mutual affection between adults instead of an
institution centered around the conjugal union of a man and woman
would diminish the social pressure on heterosexual couples to have
children within marriages or to remain married for their children’s
benefit, so the argument went.186 If these social pressures were to
evaporate, marriage and parenthood could eventually disinte-
grate.187 
This argument was premised upon the fear that legalizing same-
sex marriage expresses values at odds with traditional marital
norms.188 In addition to the argument that recognizing same-sex
marriage would express the view that the purpose of marriage is
about emotional closeness rather than conjugality, Lynn Wardle
contended that “[t]he negative characteristics of same-sex couples,”
182. See id. at 293-94, 305-07 (comparing pre- and post-no-fault divorce developments). 
183. See, e.g., LENORE WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 365-66 (1985).
184. For an example of a natural law-inflected argument, see Sherif Girgis et al., What is
Marriage?, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 245, 253-56 (2011) (arguing that marriage facilitates
the only “comprehensive” union of man and woman, one marked by sexual complementarity
and a “special connection” between married parents and their children).
185. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Disintegration of Families and Children’s Right to Their
Parents, 10 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 4 (2011).
186. See, e.g., Girgis et al., supra note 184, at 253-59; Blankenhorn, supra note 118
(“Marriage is the planet’s only institution whose core purpose is to unite the biological, social
and legal components of parenthood into one lasting bond.”). 
187. See Girgis et al., supra note 184, at 262-63.
188. See id.
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namely, that their relationships are shorter-lived and often involve
infidelity, “will and already are beginning to transform the social
expectations of marriage, and of the people who enter into marriage
in ways that will make that institution less responsible, less stable,
less monogamous, less faithful, and less committed to responsible
child-rearing.”189 Moreover, if marriage were primarily about the
adults’ emotional union and not about child-rearing, the law would
no longer send as strong a message that children need a married
mother and father.190 The weakening of this message might reduce
social pressures for husbands to remain with their wives and
children.191 
To be clear, these arguments were highly speculative, often piling
assumption upon assumption.192 It would be especially challenging
to prove the effects of this disintegration given the tremendous
decline in marriage and rise in nonmarital parenting even before
most states legalized same-sex marriage.193 Nevertheless, they
postulate a mechanism of marital disintegration.
* * * 
This Part has shown that laws and norms can work harmoniously
to promote the desired meanings or purposes of marriage. But legal
changes can also bring about disintegration by eliminating valuable
rights, affecting the significance of other rights that further ac-
cepted purposes, contradicting other laws, or undermining useful
189. Lynn D. Wardle, A Response to the “Conservative Case” for Same-Sex Marriage: Same-
Sex Marriage and “The Tragedy of the Commons,” 22 BYU J. PUB. L. 441, 460, 465-67 (2008). 
190. See Girgis et al., supra note 184, at 263.
191. See id.
192. To support this argument, Wardle cited studies detailing behaviors of unmarried male
same-sex couples, some of which were twenty to thirty years old, and none of which purported
to link the sexual behaviors they described to changing norms in (primarily heterosexual)
marriage. See, e.g., Wardle, supra note 189, at 466-67. On the other hand, recent studies
appear to confirm that some gay men live in “monogamish” relationships—relationships in
which the partners accept a certain amount of sex outside of the primary relationship. See id.
at 466; see also Edward Stein, Plural Marriage, Group Marriage and Immutability in
Obergefell v. Hodges and Beyond, 84 UMKC L. REV. 871, 879 (2016). I have not seen research
linking these behaviors to changes in heterosexual marriage.
193. See The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 18,
2010), https://www.pewsocialtrends.org/ 2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-
families/ [https://perma.cc/CJ2S-LNY6].
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norms. To be sure, there may be widespread disagreement about the
purposes of marriage; and even when people agree on those pur-
poses, there may be disagreements about which purposes should
dominate when they come into conflict. The integration framework
does not resolve those conflicts. But the integration framework
flushes out those competing purposes, creating a common ground for
debate. Whatever the hierarchy of purposes one embraces, the inte-
gration framework provides a vocabulary to assess the desirability
of legal change.
III. INTEGRITY ACROSS JURISDICTIONS
The multiple sources of marriage law invite a second type of dis-
integration: that a person might be married in some jurisdictions
but not others, resulting in the flickering of her marital status as
she crosses state lines.194 The law governing the legal consequences
of marriage has its source at both the state and federal levels.195
State law governs entrance into marriage, marital property, in-
heritance, parentage, and divorce, as well as other peripheral rights
turning on marital status under the categories of tort, employment,
and more.196 Although marriage is often described as a creature of
state law, the notion that “[t]he whole subject of the domestic
relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the States and not to the laws of the United States” has been
thoroughly debunked.197 As Jill Hasday has observed, “federal
194. Although numerous scholars have analyzed federalism issues within the family law
context, most have focused on when federal and state governments should legitimately exer-
cise authority under varied circumstances. See, e.g., Estin, supra note 45, at 271 (focusing on
“the interaction of national and state power in family law”); Jill Elaine Hasday, Federalism
and the Family Reconstructed, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1297, 1386-87 (1998). I take these exercises
of power as I find them, and instead interrogate the extent to which they harmonize, as well
as the consequences of discord.
195. Municipalities also make marital status relevant to legal incidents such as employ-
ment benefits, but their regulatory powers are limited compared to state and federal gov-
ernments. See Melissa Murray, Paradigms Lost: How Domestic Partnership Went from
Innovation to Injury, 37 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 291, 294-95 (2013). I set municipalities
aside for ease of analysis, but the same considerations that I discuss in this Section would
apply to them as well.
196. Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REV. 825, 875 n.189 (2004).
197. Id. at 874 (quoting numerous Supreme Court decisions repeating this assertion); see
also Kristin A. Collins, Federalism’s Fallacy: The Early Tradition of Federal Family Law and
the Invention of States’ Rights, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1761, 1859-60 (2005); Hasday, supra note
2019] THE INTEGRITY OF MARRIAGE 485
social security law, employee benefit law, immigration law, tax law,
Indian law, military law, same-sex marriage law, child support law,
adoption law, and family violence and abuse law are also forms of
family law.”198
This Part considers how differences in marriage laws across
jurisdictions also affect the experience of marriage as an integrated
whole.
A. Sources of Marriage Law
Marriages are simultaneously regulated by both the state in
which the couple lives as well as the federal government. In this age
of interstate travel—to say nothing of commuter marriages—the
legal significance of a marriage can vary as the couple crosses state
lines. 
The federal government is free to adopt different definitions of
marriage for the laws it administers: the Supreme Court has stated
that Congress, “in enacting discrete statutes, can make determi-
nations that bear on marital rights and privileges.”199 The federal
government sometimes defines marriage differently than the
states.200 Moreover, the legal consequences of marriage can vary
between states, because states have the sovereign authority to
regulate domestic relations within their borders, subject to consti-
tutional limits.201 This has led to some variation in entrance
requirements, property rights, and exit requirements.202
Despite the numerous different sources of marriage laws, these
laws tend to be relatively consistent. All states make marital status
determinations: states issue marriage licenses and exercise juris-
diction over divorce actions. Many federal marriage rights, such as
Social Security benefits203 and federal tax filing status,204 turn on
194, at 1300.
198. Hasday, supra note 196, at 875.
199. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 764 (2013).
200. See Joslin, supra note 45, at 798-99, 799 n.98.
201. Windsor, 570 U.S. at 767-68.
202. See Joslin, supra note 45, at 822-23, 822 n.285.
203. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(1)(A)(I) (2012) (“An applicant is the wife, husband, widow, or
widower ... if the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled ... would
find that such applicant and such insured individual were validly married.”).
204. Rev. Rul. 58-66, 1958-1 C.B. 60, 1958 WL 10653.
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these state status determinations. This practice ensures a degree of
uniform treatment despite the different sources from which mar-
riage laws flow. 
Similarly, apparent variations in state law are often mitigated in
practice. For example, spouses in community property states have
a vested one-half interest in all property acquired during marriage,
in contrast to spouses in common law states who generally hold
property acquired during marriage in their own names.205 These
differences appear substantial: for a nonearning spouse in a single-
earning marriage, it would mean holding title to half the income or
none.206 Yet, they have little practical impact.207 That is because, at
divorce, states in both systems generally apply equitable division
principles that identify and divide marital property.208 
The relatively high degree of uniformity in the face of different
authorities can be traced to several historical developments. First,
historian Nancy Cott has argued that the ease of interstate travel—
combined with the doctrine of comity, which required states, for the
most part, to respect one another’s marriage laws—meant that “[n]o
state operated in isolation,” resulting in a “recognizably national
system.”209 Moreover, “prevailing marriage patterns were seen as
evidence of national character.”210 State legislatures and judges
were influenced by developments in other states, and areas of dis-
agreement—divorce is a notable example—were both rare and
papered over in the early days by the fact that communities were
spread out and state surveillance was limited.211 Second, interven-
tion by the federal government also helped to shape state policies.
Cott points to the example of the Civil War pension system that, by
the end of the nineteenth century, comprised 40 percent of the
federal budget, and imposed and policed “a uniform standard of
205. Marsha Garrison, Good Intentions Gone Awry: The Impact of New York’s Equitable
Distribution Law on Divorce Outcomes, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 621, 628, 632 (1991).
206. See id.
207. See id. at 631-32, 632 n.38.
208. See id. (noting substantial convergence between outcomes in common law and
community property jurisdictions); cf. Kornhauser, supra note 43, at 65 (noting that the IRS
implemented the joint return and income-splitting in order to equalize community property
and common law states).
209. COTT, supra note 58, at 28.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 28-29.
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faithful monogamy” on recipients.212 Instances like these, in which
the federal government imposed a family definition and policed
conduct associated with that definition, contributed to the standard-
ization of state family status rules.213
One more source of authority—if not law—bears mentioning.
Historically, and continuing into the present, religious institutions
have been an important source of marital norms.214 Marriage is an
area in which the state and religious entities are officially inter-
twined.215 Formally speaking, religions do not dictate the legal
substance of marital obligations.216 Nonetheless, states authorize
clergy to perform legally binding marriages, and many officially
sanctioned marriages occur on religious premises.217 The close rela-
tionship between church and state increases the likelihood that
religions will impact the norms that fill the interstices of marriage
laws.218
Yet religious understandings of marriage are not monolithic,
resulting in the possibility that they too may produce a range of
212. Id. at 103-04.
213. See also W. Burlette Carter, The “Federal Law of Marriage”: Deference, Deviation, and
DOMA, 21 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 705, 721-52 (2013) (identifying various instances
in which the federal government imposed its own marriage definitions on the states); Joslin,
supra note 45, at 802-14 (analyzing how the federal government has shaped the definition of
children and the duties owed to them).
214. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, “Getting the Government Out of Marriage” Post Obergefell:
The Ill-Considered Consequences of Transforming the State’s Relationship to Marriage, 2016
U. ILL. L. REV. 1445, 1458 (noting the relationship between marital norms and values
emerging from ecclesiastical canonists and courts). Earlier in U.S. history, the federal govern-
ment worked with Protestant churches to promote Christian-model monogamy on Native
Americans. COTT, supra note 58, at 26. “Both political and religious officials assumed that
native Americans’ assimilation had to be founded on monogamous marriage, from which
would follow the conventional sexual division of labor, property, and inheritance.” Id.
215. See Wilson, supra note 214, at 1458.
216. See Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 699 (explaining that state marriage licenses are
what grant “entry into a privileged civic status”).
217. Id.
218. See generally id. (noting that the marriage ceremony is “not only a religious ritual, but
also a public rite of passage”). Many have argued that additional institutions, such as the
mass media, have a powerful impact on the social norms regarding marriage. See, e.g., Angela
Watercutter, How Pop Culture Changed the Face of the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, WIRED,
(June 27, 2013, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2013/06/pop-culture-same-sex-marriage/
[https://perma.cc/TZT2-AHJB]. These institutions undoubtedly affect people’s understandings
of marital obligations, but I focus on organized religion here because state laws expressly
contemplate the involvement of religious organizations in performing legally significant
functions.
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norms. Some of these norms will conflict with the law or with each
other. For example, despite their legal role, religious officials are
exempted from antidiscrimination laws and norms—they can
decline to perform interfaith or same-sex weddings.219 These
decisions send messages that conflict with the state’s regulatory
aims. On the flip side, religious officials can perform wedding
ceremonies that the law will not recognize.220 For example, the
Metropolitan Community Church performed wedding ceremonies for
same-sex couples decades before those marriages were legalized.221
The lack of perfect overlap between various churches and the state
suggests that religious and legal definitions of marriage can also
disintegrate. The extent to which particular religious understand-
ings of marriage overlap with the law can make marriage more
integrated in the eyes of the religious adherents.
B. Jurisdictional Disintegration
As discussed above, the rights of marriage flow from different
sources. These sources tend to complement each other, resulting in
a comprehensive overlay of one set of rights on top of the other. But
the overlay can also drift apart, creating incongruity if not outright
conflict. This too results in disintegration, the muddying of mar-
riage’s boundaries.
1. Federal and State
 Some differences in the definition of marriage are inevitable in
a federal system of government; as discussed above, states have tra-
ditionally had the power to define and regulate marriage, but
Congress can establish its own eligibility criteria for laws “that bear
219. See Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 699; see also Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo.
Civ. Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018).
220. See Nussbaum, supra note 103, at 669.
221. See James N. Birkitt, Jr., MCC and Marriage Equality, METROPOLITAN COMMUNITY
CHURCHES, http://mccchurch.org/overview/history-of-mcc/mcc-and-marriage-equality/ [https://
perma.cc/WQV2-2HW6] (describing the church’s history of performing same-sex wedding
ceremonies as early as 1968). Another example is the performance of plural marriage
ceremonies by fundamentalist Mormon sects. See, e.g., State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726, 730 & n.1
(Utah 2006) (describing religious wedding ceremonies that join a husband to more than one
wife but do not create legally valid marriages).
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on marital rights and privileges.”222 For instance, when a federal
statute that assigns a benefit conflicts with state laws turning on
state-defined family status, the federal statute will preempt the
state law as long as there are “clear and substantial” federal in-
terests at stake.223 But the federal government accepts a state’s
determination of marriage for an overwhelming number of statutes
and provisions that bear on marriage.224 This consistency generally
prevents people from seeing state and federal marriage as different
things: it promotes a single meaning of marriage, relieving them
from having to worry about the ways in which they are married.
However, for those in liminal relationships—cohabitants, same-
sex couples, foreign nationals, first cousins—marriage flickers on
and off.225 The federal government has sometimes required that
married couples provide more than evidence of a valid state mar-
riage to claim a federal benefit. To obtain legal status through
marriage, “immigrants, and their sponsoring spouses, must produce
documentary and testimonial evidence [of conduct indicating] that
their marriages are genuine,” such as jointly owning property, living
together, commingling financial resources, having children, and
generally proving that they live according to the social norms of
marriage.226 The federal government can sometimes require less
than a valid state-law marriage. The Social Security Administration
presumes that cohabiting applicants are married when determining
eligibility for means-tested SSI benefits, even if they have not
formalized their relationships under state law.227 The lack of a
marriage license will not prevent the federal government from
taking a cohabitant’s financial resources into account when deter-
mining the applicant’s eligibility.228 The result of these different
222. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 764 (2013). 
223. Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. 483, 490-91, 494-95, 497 (2013) (enforcing a federal
statute providing for the payment of life insurance proceeds to the named beneficiary over a
state statute attempting to redirect those funds to a surviving spouse by citing to Congress’s
interest in adopting “a clear and predictable procedure for” identifying beneficiaries).
224. For a fuller discussion of instances in which the federal government relies on state
definitions of marriage or provides its own, see Joslin, supra note 45, at 798-99.
225. See id. at 822-23; see also Halley, supra note 38, at 26.
226. Abrams, supra note 43, at 32.
227. See Matsumura, supra note 56, at 2022.
228. See, e.g., Dutko v. Colvin, No. 15-CV-10698, 2015 WL 6750792, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 5, 2015) (deeming a cohabiting couple to be married for purposes of calculating eligibility
for SSI benefits).
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definitions is that marriage disintegrates: the same conduct can
lead to opposite conclusions about whether a couple is married. 
The law tolerates this disintegration but has also imposed limits
when disintegration goes too far. The most visible example of the
federal government adopting its own definition of marriage in recent
years was section 3 of the DOMA, which defined marriage for the
purpose of “any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States” as “only a legal union between one man and
one woman.”229 In contrast to the “limited” federal regulation of
marriage in other statutes, DOMA affected over one thousand
federal statutes and regulations.230 As a result, some couples mar-
ried under state law would qualify for government healthcare
benefits, enjoy special protections under the Bankruptcy Code, be
eligible for Social Security survivor benefits, or file joint federal
income taxes while others would not.231 This, the Supreme Court
said in United States v. Windsor, would interfere too substantially
with the states’ authority to regulate marriage.232
2. Between States
Unlike the vertical disintegration of marriage along federal and
state lines, differences between states have received more attention,
although not within the framework of disintegration. As discussed
in the previous Part, states have the authority to regulate domestic
relations within their borders.233 Despite the existence of wide-
spread variations in a range of laws from marriage requirements to
marital property, the convergence of legal standards, as well as
choice of law and comity doctrines have minimized the practical
impact of these variations, leading to a relatively integrated insti-
tution across state lines.234 Traditionally, most states followed the
229. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996), abrogated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
230. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 at 765.
231. See id. at 772-73. In an article written several years before Windsor, Ann Estin hinted
that this state of affairs would create “an additional federalism problem,” although she did
not define the problem’s parameters. See Estin, supra note 45, at 311.
232. Id. at 768.
233. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 205-08 and infra notes 257, 262 and accompanying text; see also
Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the Problem of Non-Uniform Marriage
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lex loci rule, or “place of celebration,” under which state courts
would look to the law of the state in which the marriage was cele-
brated to determine its validity.235 The general rule had exceptions,
but they were relatively few and far between.236 As a result, even
though state laws differed, the enforceability of a couple’s marriage
would not change from state to state.237 However, disintegration
across state lines has sometimes been more significant.
One historic area of disintegration was divorce.238 Ann Estin has
catalogued how differences in the restrictiveness of divorce laws
encouraged migratory divorce.239 Around the turn of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court decided in Haddock v. Haddock that a
state divorce decree would only be given full faith and credit under
certain circumstances.240 When, for example, a state granted a
divorce over a husband and wife domiciled within that state, that
decree would be entitled to full faith and credit; but if only one
spouse was domiciled within the state, the enforceability of the
decree would turn on the circumstances under which the spouse
became a domiciliary of the state.241 In any event, the decree would
remain enforceable in the state that issued it.242 As a result, a
person could be married in one state and unmarried in another, an
outcome Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes criticized as “likely to cause
considerable disaster to innocent persons and to bastardize children
hitherto supposed to be the offspring of lawful marriage.”243 
Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 442 (2005) (describing the period between the striking down of anti-
miscegenation laws and the legalization of same-sex marriage as one of “virtually uniform
marriage laws”).
235. Grossman, supra note 234, at 461. But see William Baude, Beyond DOMA: Choice of
State Law in Federal Statutes, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1371, 1387-90 (2012) (recognizing the
complexities underlying the general approach).
236. See Grossman, supra note 234, at 462-70 (identifying a few categorical exceptions such
as polygamous marriages and semi-categorical exceptions such as evasive marriages).
237. To be clear, the current state of domicile could enforce its own marriage laws, not
those of the state of celebration, but, as discussed previously, these different legal standards
produce relatively consistent outcomes.
238. The adoption of no-fault divorce by every state has minimized the significance of
remaining legal variations. 
239. See Ann Laquer Estin, Family Law Federalism: Divorce and the Constitution, 16 WM.
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 381, 384-85 (2007).
240. 201 U.S. 562, 605-06 (1906).
241. See id. at 567-72.
242. See id. at 605-06.
243. Id. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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This all changed when the Supreme Court reversed Haddock in
Williams v. North Carolina.244 Williams involved a couple who trav-
eled to Nevada to divorce their spouses, whom they left back in
North Carolina, and then get married.245 After they returned to
North Carolina, they were convicted of bigamous cohabitation.246
The Court held that as long as the couple were Nevada domiciliaries
at the time the Nevada court issued its divorce decree, that decree
must be given full faith and credit.247 The Court emphasized the
importance of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in “altering the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties by
making them integral parts of a single nation,”248 and bringing
“separate sovereign states into an integrated whole.”249 By allowing
states to regulate marriages within their borders while simul-
taneously recognizing divorce decrees issued by sister states, this
rule ensured a degree of predictability for individuals traveling from
state to state.250
A second example of disintegration involves miscegenation laws.
Many states had laws prohibiting interracial marriage but some did
not.251 States with anti-miscegenation laws would therefore have to
decide whether to recognize interracial marriages validly contracted
elsewhere in the United States. Andrew Koppelman has shown that
with a few exceptions, courts refused to recognize marriages con-
tracted in foreign states for the purpose of evading the state’s
marriage restrictions, but were divided when the couples were
previous domiciliaries of those foreign states.252 The North Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, declared that interracial marriages
244. 317 U.S. 287, 304 (1942).
245. Id. at 289-90.
246. Id. at 289.
247. Id. at 298-99 (“[E]ach state, by virtue of its command over its domiciliaries and its
large interest in the institution of marriage, can alter within its own borders the marriage
status of the spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent.”).
248. Id. at 301-02 (emphasis added) (citation and quotations omitted).
249. Id. at 303 (emphasis added).
250. See id.
251. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6 & n.5 (1967) (noting that at the time of the
decision sixteen states still criminalized interracial marriage while fourteen states had re-
pealed such laws in the previous fifteen years); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage and
Public Policy: The Miscegenation Precedents, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 105, 114 (1996) (noting
that forty-one states had laws barring miscegenation).
252. See Koppelman, supra note 251, at 116 & n.39.
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were “immoral,” “opposed to public policy,” and even “revolting”
within the state.253 But the court noted that, unlike incest and
polygamy, “such cannot be said to be the common sentiment of the
civilized and Christian world.”254 Although North Carolina would
have to tolerate the “bad example of an unnatural and immoral but
lawful [where contracted] cohabitation,” the alternative was worse:
“there should not be one law in Maine and another in Texas, but ...
the same law shall prevail at least throughout the United States.”255
The Tennessee Supreme Court took the opposite view, favoring the
sovereign right of the state to reject marriages contravening public
policy.256 Uncertainty about the validity of interracial marriages
persisted until the Supreme Court’s decision striking down all mis-
cegenation bans in Loving v. Virginia.257
The third, and most recent example involves the interstate rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages. After Hawaii almost legalized
same-sex marriage in 1993,258 some states began to panic about
whether they would have to recognize same-sex marriages perform-
ed in other states, often passing laws expressing policies against
recognition.259 Surprisingly, Congress intervened to thwart unifor-
mity between the states, declaring in section 2 of DOMA that no
state would be required to recognize same-sex marriages from other
states.260 DOMA inevitably led to the precise situation that Williams
v. North Carolina condemned: that couples’ marriages would flicker
on and off as they moved from state to state.261 The Obergefell Court
253. State v. Ross, 76 N.C. 242, 244, 246 (1877).
254. Id. at 246.
255. Id. at 247.
256. State v. Bell, 66 Tenn. 9, 10-11 (1872) (reasoning that to hold otherwise would invite
“the father living with his daughter, the son with the mother, the brother with the sister, in
lawful wedlock”).
257. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
258. See Mark Strasser, Unity, Sovereignty, and the Interstate Recognition of Marriage, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1999).
259. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 234, at 446-51; Tobias Barrington Wolff, Interest
Analysis in Interjurisdictional Marriage Disputes, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2240-44 (2005).
260. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (codified at 1 U.S.C. §
7 (2000), and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000) abrogated by United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744
(2013)). 
261. See Grossman, supra note 234, at 477-86 (providing examples of this flickering
recognition of marriages). 
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ended this “instability and uncertainty” when it recognized the right
of same-sex couples to marry.262
These examples reveal a pattern. When state marriage laws di-
verge too far, resulting in significant groups of people uncertain
about the legality of their marital status, the Supreme Court has
intervened. By constitutionalizing whether states need to recognize
each other’s divorce decrees, or whether laws restricting marriage
based on race or sex are valid, the Supreme Court has quashed dis-
integration and promoted integration.263
IV. EVALUATING INTEGRATION
We have seen that marriage becomes more integrated when laws
and norms are internally consistent regarding the purposes of mar-
riage and when those packages of laws and norms are consistent
from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. This Part asks, “to what end?”
What are the benefits and drawbacks of integration? This Part
constructs a normative framework for evaluating the desirability of
fully integrated marriage.
A. Benefits of Integration
Most courts have assumed that marriage should be a legally and
socially integrated institution rather than a shaggy assemblage of
disparate legal rights.264 As mentioned above, the Supreme Court
has multiple times spoken of marriage as a “unified” or “integrated”
whole without defining those concepts.265 Likewise, in his influential
262. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607-08 (2015) (“Even an ordinary drive into
a neighboring State to visit family or friends risks causing severe hardship in the event of a
spouse’s hospitalization while across state lines.”).
263. By ruling that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of same-sex couples to
marry in every state, the Obergefell Court obviated the question whether the Full Faith and
Credit Clause would require states to recognize lawful marriages notwithstanding state laws
articulating public policies against same-sex marriage. Id. For context, see Steve Sanders, Is
the Full Faith and Credit Clause Still “Irrelevant” to Same-Sex Marriage?: Toward a Recon-
sideration of the Conventional Wisdom, 89 IND. L.J. 95, 102-03, 108 (2014), describing the
“conventional wisdom” that the Full Faith and Credit Clause would not invalidate state laws
articulating a policy against recognizing same-sex marriages, and identifying some scholars
taking the contrary view.
264. See supra Part I.
265. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2600; Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 303
2019] THE INTEGRITY OF MARRIAGE 495
nineteenth century family law treatise, Joel Prentiss Bishop de-
clared, 
[F]or the peace of the world, for the prosperity of its respective
communities, for the well-being of families, for virtue in social
life, for good morals, for religion, for everything held dear by the
race of man in common, it is necessary there should be one
universal rule whereby to determine whether parties are to be
regarded as married or not.266
This Section identifies the salutary features of integration omitted
by these sweeping and conclusory statements.
1. Consistency and Related Values
Integration brings about consistency, which helps to promote
other important values such as fairness, equality, and communi-
tarianism. Consistency also enables people to make valuable
investments in their life projects. 
When the rules of marriage are internally coherent and have a
consistent meaning across jurisdictions, they promote fairness and
equal treatment. Courts and scholars have emphasized the role
uniform family status rules can play in protecting individual lib-
erties and promoting “fairness and equality.”267 In considering
DOMA’s federal definition of marriage, the Windsor Court was
particularly troubled by the effect of leaving same-sex couples
married for purposes of state but not federal law, thus creating two
classes of marriages within each state.268 To be sure, the effects of
this inconsistency were felt most acutely by same-sex spouses, who
shouldered the uncertainty of being simultaneously married and
unmarried, deprived of “the stability and predictability of basic
personal relations the State has found it proper to acknowledge and
(1942).
266. JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, AND SEPARA-
TION § 856 (1891).
267. Joslin, supra note 45, at 817; see also Sanders, supra note 263, at 110 (noting the
ability of uniform marital status to “[p]rotect[ ] individual rights and liberty against coercive
and discriminatory state power”).
268. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
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protect.”269 But, more broadly, this situation violated “the long-
established precept that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage are uniform for all married couples within each State.”270
To the Court, uniformity was not merely an abstract goal.271 The
Court emphasized the importance to families of being able to see
their relationships reflected in the state’s broader institutions—to
understand their “concord with other families in their community
and in their daily lives.”272 
The Windsor Court made clear that this “concord” was not the
exclusive concern of same-sex families.273 Marriage would surely
help same-sex couples to see themselves reflected in the eyes of
their community.274 But it would also allow opposite-sex couples to
understand the significance of their marriage through the inclusion
of same-sex couples.275 That inclusion revealed “the community’s
considered perspective on the ... institution of marriage” and “the
meaning of equality.”276 Judges and scholars have accused this
portion of the Windsor opinion of raising a jumbled federalism
argument. Justice Scalia, for example, called it “rootless,” and noted
that readers might be “fool[ed] ... into thinking that this is a
federalism opinion” although the opinion “formally disclaimed
reliance upon principles of federalism.”277 But seen through the lens
of integration, this part of the opinion snaps into focus. Rather than
articulating a federalism argument, Windsor was articulating an
integrity principle.
Consistency also enables spouses to pursue their life goals. As
Courtney Joslin has observed, “[F]or many, getting married provides
a sense of permanence and emotional security.”278 The Supreme
Court in Williams v. North Carolina called the possibility that one
269. Id.
270. Id. at 768 (emphasis added) (noting that although certain eligibility rules for marriage
vary between the states, they “are in every event consistent within each State” (emphasis
added)).
271. See id.
272. Id. at 772.
273. Id.
274. See id.
275. See id.
276. Id. at 769. 
277. Id. at 791-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
278. Joslin, supra note 45, at 822; see also Matsumura, supra note 57, at 1535 (arguing that
marriage “promotes stability”).
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could be “lawfully divorced and remarried in Nevada and still
married to the first spouse in North Carolina .... the most perplexing
and distressing complication in the domestic relations of many
citizens in the different States.”279 Uncertainty might take an
emotional toll but can also have practical impacts. One court con-
sidering the validity of same-sex marriages lawfully entered under
uncertain legal circumstances observed that nonrecognition could
place families “in a state of legal limbo,” “caus[ing] harm each day
that the marriage is not recognized.”280 Another court said that “[i]n
terms of the personal ordering and orderliness of one’s most
fundamental affairs, nothing would be more destructive of ‘ordered
liberty.’”281 The courts identified a whole range of decisions, from
child-rearing to estate planning, that would remain unsettled
without certainty about legal status.282 “[A] function of the right to
marry is not only to protect settled expectations, but actually to
settle the expectations of the couple and others on an ongoing
basis.”283 When legal differences cause a marriage to flicker on and
off, they interfere with this critical function.284
2. Information and Expectations
By standardizing and harmonizing marriage law, integration also
simplifies the task of conveying the legal consequences of marriage,
settling the expectations of the spouses and third parties and com-
municating the state’s message about marriage’s ideal content. In
an influential article, Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith argue that
property rights must track a limited number of standard forms to
reduce the costs of processing information about those rights.285
279. 317 U.S. 287, 299 (1942) (citation and quotation marks omitted). The Court seemed
particularly concerned about the significance of the consequences of this inconsistency—in
this case, criminal prosecution, and in others, illegitimacy. See id. at 299-300.
280. Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1210 (D. Utah 2014).
281. Caspar v. Snyder, 77 F. Supp. 3d 616, 629 (E.D. Mich. 2015).
282. See Matsumura, supra note 57, at 1534-39.
283. Id. at 1539.
284. See, e.g., id. at 1538 (discussing how California’s Proposition 8 would have invalidated
months of same-sex marriages and disrupted peoples’ lives).
285. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 55, at 3-8. 
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They name this phenomenon “the numerus clausus—the number is
closed.”286 Merrill and Smith contend that property rights are 
restricted to a limited number of standardized forms.... [due to]
the in rem nature of property rights: When property rights are
created, third parties must expend time and resources to
determine the attributes of these rights, both to avoid violating
them and to acquire them from present holders. The existence
of unusual property rights increases the cost of processing
information about all property rights.... Standardization of
property rights reduces these measurement costs.287
These measurement costs are not the only costs that affect optimal
standardization of property rights.288 Merrill and Smith note that
standardization can impose “frustration costs” when they interfere
with otherwise legitimate exercises of autonomy.289 Optimal stan-
dardization also considers administrative costs—costs related to
the distribution and enforcement of rights.290 Considering this
optimization challenge, Nestor Davidson has observed that although
standardization might interfere with an individual’s autonomy in-
terests,291 such interference “represents inevitable tradeoffs between
those choices and the effects those choices have on others.”292 
According to Merrill and Smith, the standardization of forms goes
hand-in-glove with the in rem nature of property rights—rights that
are binding against all the world.293 If property forms were to pro-
liferate, they would impose an increasing burden on third parties to
gather information in order to avoid violating those novel property
286. Id. at 4.
287. Id. at 8; see also Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract
Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773, 777 (2001) (“[F]ree customization of property forms would
create an information-cost externality.”).
288. Merrill & Smith, supra note 55, at 35.
289. Id. (downplaying these frustration costs because of the ability to tailor more com-
plicated relationships through the combination of standardized forms).
290. Id. at 38; see also Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property
Law, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1597, 1653 (2008) (“[T]he forms of property are primarily tools to assist
legal actors—courts, legislatures, and other formal sources of legal recognition—in their
regulatory role.”).
291. See Davidson, supra note 290, at 1620 (noting the importance of property to individual
identity).
292. Id. at 1602.
293. Merrill & Smith, supra note 287, at 777.
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rights.294 The classic features of in rem rights—that they (1) “apply
to a large and indefinite class of dutyholders;” (2) “attach to persons
only insofar as they own particular ‘things’ and not otherwise”; (3)
are both held by, and owed to, a “large and indefinite class”; and (4)
“are always duties of abstention rather than performance”295—
resolve rights disputes at “relatively low cost.”296 The relative
simplicity of the duty of abstention (“keep off”), as compared to
obligations to perform in a particular manner, vastly reduces
information costs.297
Merrill and Smith’s theory has been subject to critique, both by
those who question whether the information cost thesis is accurate
as a descriptive matter,298 and those who argue that the phenom-
enon of limiting property forms can be better explained by other
needs. Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman have argued, for
instance, that the limitation in forms addresses the need for third
parties to obtain notice of rights that run with a particular asset by
making it easier to verify the ownership of rights offered for con-
veyance.299 Hanoch Dagan has argued that the best justification for
standardization is that it consolidates the expectations of the
owners themselves and expresses the ideal forms of their underlying
relationship.300
Resolving these disputes goes beyond the needs of the present
context. These different accounts all agree that the numerus clausus
facilitates the acquisition of important information even if they
disagree on the paramount purpose for which that information is
used.
Thus far, scholars studying the intersection of family structure
and informational issues have largely focused on the problem of
signaling commitment to spouses and potential spouses. Elizabeth
294. Id.
295. Id. at 789.
296. Id. at 793.
297. See id. at 797.
298. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification:
The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 380-82
(2002).
299. See id. at 374.
300. Hanoch Dagan, The Craft of Property, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1517, 1567 (2004); see also id.
at 1570 (“The forms of property matter—they should matter—because these configurations
of property rights constitute property institutions that facilitate various categories of human
interaction and thus promote important human values.”).
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Scott has argued that the commitment norms of marriage enable
potential spouses to signal to each other that they are willing to
make a reciprocal commitment through their choice to marry.301
Other scholars have similarly studied marriage as a signal of
commitment or constraint.302 Certainly, the integration of marriage
can affect the ability of potential spouses to signal availability and
commitment: if multiple kinds of marriage existed, verification
would require more complicated investigation.303
More significant, but less explored, is the fact that marriage sat-
isfies additional types of informational needs: (1) it provides notice
to the spouses of the legal duties that they owe to the state, third
parties, and each other; (2) it identifies spouses as married to each
other and themselves; and (3) it identifies a couple as married to the
state and third parties, which facilitates the enforcement of laws
and norms. Integration affects all of these informational needs. 
First, as demonstrated above, marriage is accompanied by a
host of legal rights and duties, some of which are mandatory and
others of which can be altered by private agreement.304 Scholars
have expressed skepticism that couples can know even a fraction
of the legal rules that govern the marital relationship.305 Yet a
passing knowledge of the rights and duties of marriage would seem
301. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1955; see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott,
Marriage as a Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1255-56 (1998); Michael J. Trebilcock,
Marriage as a Signal, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 245, 250 (F.H. Buckley
ed., 1999).
302. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 70-73 (noting how marriage can secure investments
by the other party and deter cheating); William Bishop, ‘Is He Married?’: Marriage as Infor-
mation, 34 U. TORONTO L.J. 245, 246 (1984) (characterizing the marriage contract as “a
guarantee of a return on investment”).
303. Bishop, supra note 302, at 254 (“Verification [of marital availability] would undoubt-
edly be more difficult if the questioner had to ask about type A, type B, or type C marriages.”).
304. See supra notes 1, 4, 113-15 and accompanying text.
305. See Lynn A. Baker, Promulgating the Marriage Contract, 23 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
217, 221-22 (1990) (discussing how marriage is one of the few areas where there has been a
movement towards greater disclosure of the law); Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When
Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of
Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 440-41, 445 (1993) (finding that marriage-license
applicants surveyed had “largely incorrect perceptions of the legal terms of the marriage
contract as embodied in divorce statutes”); Nancy D. Polikoff, Making Marriage Matter Less:
The ALI Domestic Partner Principles Are One Step in the Right Direction, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 353, 370-72 (asserting that variations in state laws establishing obligations between
spouses means couples generally remain unaware of the specific legal obligations attendant
to marriage).
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necessary to promote social policies and protect the expectations of
people in marital relationships. Although some scholars have an-
alyzed the desirability of educating spouses about key marriage
laws,306 and at least one state, Louisiana, requires officers to “de-
liver to each prospective spouse ... a printed summary of the then
current matrimonial regime laws,”307 scholars who have pondered
the issue have generally fallen back on social norms to provide
adequate knowledge of baseline marital commitments.308 Without
actual knowledge of marriage’s substantive terms, it is social norms
that define marital behavior and allow a person to live his life with-
out having to constantly question his actions or the actions of
others.309 For the most part, the law does not intervene in people’s
marriages, relying instead on these norms to guide spouses’ con-
duct.310 Thus, the less standardized the rights and norms associated
with marriage, the less effective marriage will be in broadcasting
the legal consequences of the relationship. The more marriage is
constant in meaning over time, the more that meaning will govern
conduct and people can rely on that meaning to structure their af-
fairs.311 If a goal of marriage is to provide knowledge of the default
rules that govern the marital relationship, the least costly option
would seem best.312
Although many of the rights running between the marital couple
and the state cannot be altered by private agreement—for instance,
Social Security eligibility or tax filing status—spouses can contract
around default property obligations.313 This raises the possibility
that the relationship will be governed by a combination of state-
provided rules and contractual, in personam obligations. If the
spouses are aware of the rules they are altering and the advantages
306. See Baker, supra note 305, at 223.
307. LA. STAT. ANN. § 9:237 (2014).
308. See, e.g., Carbone & Cahn, supra note 176 (noting that the institutionalized
expectations of marriage are well-understood and deliberately chosen by those who marry);
Kaiponanea T. Matsumura, Consent to Intimate Regulation, 96 N.C. L. REV. 1013, 1042-43
(2018).
309. See Cherlin, supra note 144, at 848.
310. See Scott, supra note 126, at 1907-12.
311. Ayelet Blecher-Prigat has made a similar argument in the context of parentage. See
Ayelet Blecher-Prigat, Conceiving Parents, 41 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 119, 134 (2018) (focusing
on the ability of the law to express the rights and duties that accompany parenthood).
312. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
313. See Bix, supra note 174, at 158.
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those rules would provide,314 then the creation of personalized duties
running between the spouses will be both efficient and proper; after
all, they are in the best position to know and enforce those specific
obligations.315 But scholars have expressed skepticism that the
spouses understand the rights they are trading away.316 Further,
the in personam obligations could never fully supplant the package
of marital rights.317 Even within this context, therefore, the legal
system has an interest in promoting a clear understanding of
default legal rules.
Second, spouses need to know that they are married. Although
the idea that a person might not realize she is married seems far-
fetched, common law marriage can result in the partners being
treated as legally married or partnered without their knowledge or
against their wishes.318 As one court put it: 
Some persons may mistakenly believe they are common law
spouses if they have lived with another for an extended period
of time .... Others may assume that they can never be deemed
married unless they have gone through the statutory formali-
ties.... [T]hey may discover too late that they have foregone
rights or undertaken responsibilities contrary to their inten-
tions.319
Moreover, as discussed above, differences in state and federal defi-
nitions of marriage can result in couples being married for some
purposes but not others.320 Just as for states and third parties, these
problems would be obviated by a single, unambiguous legal status. 
314. Cf. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968-69 (1979) (noting that divorcing couples bargain
in the shadow of legal rules governing alimony, custody, etc., that provide the spouses with
“bargaining chips” that will affect the outcome of their negotiations).
315. See Merrill & Smith, supra note 287, at 837.
316. See Bix, supra note 174, at 195.
317. See, e.g., Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19-20 (Ct. App. 1993) (preventing
spouses from altering nondelegable duties of support through private agreement).
318. See, e.g., Matsumura, supra note 56, at 2060-63 (collecting examples in which marital
status was uncertain).
319. PNC Bank Corp. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269, 1280-81 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2003).
320. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
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Third, and relatedly, states and third parties seeking to regulate
intimate relationships face an identification problem.321 Relation-
ships that look the same to an outside observer may or may not be
legal marriages: couples may live together, perform stereotypical
divisions of labor, and even adopt the same surname without for-
malizing their relationships.322 Historically, the doctrine of com-
mon law marriage responded to this concern, wrapping cohabiting
couples in the mantle of marriage to avoid the stains of immorality
and illegitimacy.323 In this capacity, it functioned to channel illicit
relationships into the single form of marriage.324 Now that cohabita-
tion is legal, states struggle to identify relationships entitled to legal
protection and to determine the legal consequences that should flow
from them.325 The dominant approach has been to protect partners
by recognizing the enforceability of private agreements between
them326—the opposite of a numerus clausus.
The recognition of prenuptial agreements also creates challenges
in the opposite direction: couples may be formally married under
state law and appear that way to the state, yet, they may have
agreed not to create marital property or to provide each other
financial support upon divorce.327 Relying on formal status as a
proxy for economic unity, the government may provide the couple
benefits such as income-splitting on a joint tax return328 when in
fact the higher-earning spouse is retaining all of the property in her
own name. The higher-earning spouse potentially pays less tax than
321. See Matsumura, supra note 56, at 2035.
322. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (involving a
claimed agreement by a nonmarital couple to live together, hold themselves out to the public
as husband and wife, and exchange career opportunities for domestic services); Hewitt v.
Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1205 (Ill. 1979) (involving Victoria Hewitt’s claim that she and
Robert Hewitt lived in a marriage-like relationship in which she raised the couple’s children
and advanced his career).
323. See Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM.
L. REV. 957, 964 (2000).
324. See id.
325. See Matsumura, supra note 308, at 1021-25.
326. See id. at 1020-21.
327. See, e.g., UNIFORM PREMARITAL AND MARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT §§ 2(4)-2(5) (NAT’L
CONFERENCE OF COMMR’S ON STATE LAWS 2012) (allowing spouses to bargain away rights to
spousal support, and rights to property).
328. See Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1417 (1975) (“Once enacted ... income splitting for married couples came to be seen as a tax
allowance for family responsibilities.”).
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a comparable-earning single filer, and gets to retain the full value
of the savings.329 Meanwhile, the purpose of that particular tax
treatment is thwarted.330 Likewise, a third party relying on the
existence of the marriage in determining their dealings with the
couple—for example, a well-known painter who accepts a commis-
sion to produce a valuable work—may rely on the resources of both
spouses rather than the individual who directly bargained for the
work.331 In fact, the obligation might flow to one spouse without
substantial assets.332 Without a legal mechanism for forcing the
disclosure of the terms of the spouses’ agreement, third parties
cannot know about the spouses’ respective property rights. Even
with such a mechanism, measurement costs would be externalized
to third parties. 
Increased measurement costs also affect the community enforce-
ment of social norms. As discussed at length above, the effectiveness
of both behavioral norms and enforcement norms depends on their
clarity.333 As Eric Posner has observed, “the existence of multiple or
idiosyncratic relationships might be so confusing to the members of
the community that community enforcement [of norms] becomes
impossible.”334 For example, Posner notes that an extramarital affair
counts as “opportunism in a traditional household.”335 Spouses
might privately agree to allow such affairs but “members of the com-
munity cannot be expected to know enough about [the] marriage
agreement” to police it: “They need a standard form marriage
against which to measure [all others], so that they know what
counts as opportunism.”336 Like property, the definition of marriage
signals something about that particular relationship “to the rest of
the world.”337 Integration of marriage into a single, formal status
would simplify the task of identification.
329. See id.
330. See id.
331. See Bishop, supra note 302, at 259.
332. See id. (suggesting a few instances in which third parties might wish to discriminate
based on marital status, such as if banks deem married individuals to be more creditworthy
and rely on proof of marriage when deciding whether to extend credit).
333. See supra Part II.A.
334. POSNER, supra note 126, at 79.
335. Id.
336. Id. at 80.
337. Bishop, supra note 302, at 258. 
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B. Costs of Integration
Integration also has its costs. Standardization comes at the ex-
pense of individual autonomy.338 Scholars have argued at length
that the choices to marry or not to marry, as well as the choice to
remain married, are protected precisely because they enable self-
definition.339 Taken to its extreme, integration would result in a
single package of rights consistent across jurisdictions.340 Marriage
would be a take-it-or-leave-it whole. In contrast to the current state
of the law, which allows some customization of rights,341 such an
approach would narrow the range of choices, constricting couples’
freedom to structure their relationships as they see fit.342 
To an extent, the conflict between standardization and autonomy
is overstated. Regardless of whether they wish to structure their
lives around marriage or be governed by it, couples understand their
choices through the lens of marriage.343 If marriage lost its singular
meaning, the choice to, or not to, marry would be less of a “momen-
tous act[ ] of self-definition.”344 The clarity of options can facilitate
that choice. Moreover, couples would remain free, in private, to
behave as they see fit. Standardization would simply perpetuate the
historical division between public and private spheres, with the
338. See Davidson, supra note 290, at 1622 (noting this tension within the realm of
property law). 
339. See, e.g., Courtney G. Joslin, The Gay Rights Canon and the Right to Nonmarriage,
97 B.U. L. REV. 425, 467 (2017); Matsumura, supra note 57, at 1530-34; Strauss, supra note
30, at 1723.
340. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
341. All states allow marital agreements under certain circumstances. See, e.g., Barbara
A. Atwood, Marital Contracts and the Meaning of Marriage, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 11, 13-14 (2014)
(noting the trend toward greater enforceability); Brian H. Bix, Private Ordering and Family
Law, 23 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW. 249, 264 (2010) (noting that all states allow prenuptial
agreements in some form).
342. See HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 68-70
(2017) (arguing that self-authorship requires a range of viable options); see also Sonia K.
Katyal, The Numerus Clausus of Sex, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 405 (2017) (noting that the re-
striction of legal options can result in exclusion for those whose identities (or preferences) are
not recognized).
343. See Matsumura, supra note 57, at 1538-39.
344. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (quoting Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955 (Mass. 2003)). But see Courtney G. Joslin, Autonomy in the
Family, 66 UCLA L. REV. 4, 4-15 (2019) (arguing that many cohabitants are not making a
conscious choice not to marry).
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spouses’ idiosyncratic performances falling on the private side.345
Additionally, individuals would have the ultimate choice whether to
marry in the first place.
That said, it would be difficult not to see the contraction of in-
dividual freedom to choose the legal consequences of one’s intimate
conduct as a threat to autonomy. Beyond restricting the options
from which to choose, the concentration of authority in a singular
institution would inherently reflect the preferences of those in pow-
er.346 The privileging of some norms and values would come at the
expense of others, resulting in practical and expressive harms.
Disintegration permits the development of a plurality of norms that
might better accommodate some people’s needs, lead to the recogni-
tion of previously neglected relationships of value—such as same-
sex partnerships—and disrupt hierarchies.347
The rationale of integration also threatens the proliferation of
a plurality of marriage-like forms.348 Marriage can be completely
integrated irrespective of alternate statuses if its rules are inter-
nally coherent and consistent across jurisdictions.349 The presence
of something like civil unions should not impact the integrity of
marriage as I have defined it. But if, as I argue, a fundamental
benefit of integration is informational, competing forms may crowd
the field, leaving marriage less able to communicate its content.
This possibility explains why at least some states have resisted
345. Cf. Mary Anne Case, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1772-73 (2005) (noting
the power formal marriage confers on spouses to structure their private affairs as they see fit).
346. See FRANKE, supra note 159, at 12-13 (“[T]he implicit whiteness of normative
homosexuality has delivered a racial endowment to the same-sex marriage movement that
has most certainly helped the cause of marriage equality, but sometimes at the expense of the
rights and interests of both normative and non-normative families of color.”); Katyal, supra
note 342, at 411-12 (noting that the consequence of granting the state monopoly power in as-
signing one’s sex is to create a hierarchy of privilege that benefits some and burdens others).
347. See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status: Collaboration and
the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 293, 344-58 (2015) (demon-
strating how same-sex couples used contract law to develop collaborative networks, paving
the way to formal recognition of their relationships).
348. No states continue to criminalize cohabitation. Most states allow cohabiting couples
to create legally enforceable obligations. See, e.g., Margaret Ryznar & Anna Stepien-Sporek,
Cohabitation Worldwide Today, 35 GA. ST. U.L. REV. 299, 303 (2019). And a minority of states
have created formal, alternative legal statuses for couples. See, e.g., COL. REV. STAT. ANN. §
15-22-104 (West 2013) (indicating that marriage is not required to acquire designated
beneficiary status); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 75/20 (West 2011) (civil unions).
349. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
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extending marriage-like rights to people in nonmarital relation-
ships.350 The purported need to have marriage speak clearly has
justified the refusal to recognize relationships even when it would
otherwise be equitable to do so.351
V. INSIGHTS FROM INTEGRATION
The previous Parts have subjected integration and disintegration
to a searching inquiry and provided a framework for considering
integration’s benefits and pitfalls. What might this comprehensive
account say about contemporary disputes over marriage? Examples
abound, and this Part considers two, one within marriage law and
one outside of it: the future of marital presumption statutes and the
recognition of alternate nonmarital relationship statuses.
A. Marriage and Parenthood
Changes to the positive law of marriage are constantly being pro-
posed, lauded, and criticized. The integration framework uncovers
the foundational purposes of marriage on which critiques are based,
enables courts and policymakers to debate the validity of those
purposes, and assesses the legal changes in light of those purposes.
This Article opened by claiming that two cases, Smith v. Pavan
and Turner v. Steiner, although perhaps unexceptional within the
context of the fight over LGBT equality, were actually stunning
examples of marital disintegration.352 The intervening analysis
shows why this is so. In Pavan, the Arkansas Department of Health
refused to list a birth mother’s wife on the child’s birth certificate
despite the fact that the child was conceived during the marriage.353
Arkansas had adopted a rebuttable presumption that “[i]f the
350. See, e.g., Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 586 (Cal. 1988) (en banc) (noting the
importance of exclusivity in promoting marriage); Charron v. Amaral, 889 N.E.2d 946, 950
(Mass. 2008).
351. See, e.g., Charron, 889 N.E.2d at 951 (denying a nonmarital same-sex partner stand-
ing to sue for loss of consortium on the grounds that the partners were not married at the
time of injury, even though the partners took many steps to establish the seriousness of the
relationship and were denied the legal right to marry).
352. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
353. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172 (Ark. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017) (per
curiam).
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mother was married at the time of either conception or birth or
between conception and birth the name of the husband shall be
entered on the certificate as the father of the child.”354 Despite the
sex-specific language, the statute seems to impose parental rights
on the nongestational spouse on the basis of marriage.355 But the
court reasoned that the purpose of the presumption was not to pro-
tect the integrity of the marital family.356 The use of the term
“father,” the court found, revealed a focus “on the relationship of the
biological mother and the biological father to the child.”357 The state
contended that birth certificates primarily allowed the state to com-
pile vital statistics for public health research purposes, enabling
people to identify “personal health issues and genetic conditions.”358
The plaintiffs countered that birth certificates play a crucial role in
applying for important benefits, such as employment-related ben-
efits, survivors’ benefits, and inheritance rights.359 But the Arkansas
Supreme Court brushed this argument aside, insisting that birth
certificates and parental rights are two different things.360
In Turner v. Steiner, a birth mother claimed that because her wife
neither gave birth to nor adopted a child conceived through artifi-
cial insemination and born during their marriage, the wife lacked
standing to request parental rights during the dissolution of their
marriage.361 The court refused the nonbirth mother’s request to
apply the marital presumption statute in a gender-neutral way,
reasoning that “the purpose of the presumption statute is to assist
in determining whether a man is a child’s biological father, ... not to
broadly establish a term or condition associated with marriage.”362
The court went further: “with the exception of adoption, ... parent-
age in Arizona is determined by biology.”363
354. Id. at 175 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1) (2018)).
355. See id.
356. Id. at 178.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 179.
359. Id. at 180.
360. Id.
361. Turner v. Steiner, 398 P.3d 110, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), abrogated by McLaughlin
v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017). The statute at issue in Turner had to do with parentage
rather than birth certificates, and, in contrast to Arkansas, Arizona lacks a statute governing
sperm donation. See id. at 113.
362. Id. at 114.
363. Id.
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Let us pause for a moment to see these cases for what they are:
judicial pronouncements that parenthood and marriage are inher-
ently separate. These cases proclaim that parenthood is about
biology, not marriage. Recall the argument against same-sex mar-
riage that redefining marriage as an emotional union between two
adults would unravel the norm that marriage is about children—
indirect disintegration.364 The Arkansas and Arizona cases accom-
plish directly what same-sex marriage opponents feared would occur
indirectly: the severing of marriage and parenthood. They depart
from the deeply rooted principle of family integrity memorialized in
Michael H. v. Gerald D., in which the Supreme Court noted that a
traditional purpose of the presumption was to protect the marital
family from claims by potential genetic parents that would disrupt
the marital family.365 The Michael H. Court recognized that the
putative father’s genetic connection might provide an opportunity
to form a meaningful relationship with the child.366 But to allow
“inquiries into the child’s paternity ... would be destructive of family
integrity and privacy.”367
One might counter that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the
Arkansas Supreme Court, thereby restoring the connection between
marriage and parentage. But that is not what the Court did. In
Pavan v. Smith, the Court summarily reversed, but it did so because
the facts indicated that Arkansas had “chosen to make its birth
certificates more than a mere marker of biological relationships,”
for example, by naming the husband of a woman who conceives a
child through anonymous sperm donation.368 It was this unequal
treatment that violated Obergefell’s command not to deny same-sex
couples access “to the ‘constellation of benefits that the Stat[e] ha[s]
364. See Girgis et al., supra note 184, at 260-61. 
365. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 123-25 (1989). Part of this historical
resistance to recognizing the claims of biological fathers over husbands can be explained by
the harsh consequences stemming from illegitimacy. See id. at 125. 
366. Id. at 128-29 (citing Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262-65 (1983)).
367. Id. at 120.
368. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078-79 (2017) (per curiam). In such a case, the
husband would be listed as the father on the birth certificate notwithstanding the lack of a
biological relationship. See id. at 2078.
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linked to marriage.’”369 The Court expressed no opinion on the
state’s power to sever marriage and parenthood.370
Reframing this debate through the integration framework
produces several insights. First, it reveals the agreement between
same-sex marriage advocates and opponents about the relevant
purpose of marriage in relation to this dispute: to raise children
within the stable adult relationship that marriage theoretically
creates. With that purpose as the baseline, tension between efforts
to prevent same-sex couples from accessing the same parental rights
as opposite-sex couples and any professed desire to protect the
integrity of marriage becomes clear. Even if recognizing same-sex
marriage “teaches that marriage is more about the desires of adults
than about the needs—or rights—of children,”371 which might
indirectly change the way people generally think about the rela-
tionship between marriage and gender-differentiated parenting,
opposing the extension of the marital presumption to same-sex
couples only accelerates the problem. Courts saying that parent-
hood is based on biology, not marriage, do not restore the link be-
tween marriage and parentage. Moreover, elevating the importance
of a biological connection between parent and child stigmatizes
adoptive families.372 To the extent that efforts to weaken the marital
presumption are the residue of opposition to same-sex marriage,
they hoist marriage equality opponents upon their own petard.
369. Id. at 2078 (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015)) (alterations
in original).
370. The touchstone of the Court’s Pavan opinion was equal treatment, not any particular
view about the rights of marriage. See id. at 2076 (quoting Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2605)
(noting the importance of offering marriage to same-sex couples “on the same terms and
conditions as opposite-sex couples”). Although all states have marital presumption statutes,
those statutes have differed in how easily the presumption may be rebutted, with some states
making biological evidence virtually conclusive and others limiting the grounds. See June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, 84 UMKC
L. REV. 663, 665-67 (2016).
371. Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage, the Court, and the Future, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
361, 399 (2017).
372. See Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L .REV. 1065,
1070 (noting that the emphasis on biology comes at the expense of other forms of kinship). The
argument against disintegrating marriage and parenthood initially did not depend on
biological ties or elevate biological parenthood over adoption. For example, Lynn Wardle, a
longtime critic of same-sex marriage, argued that the “marital union” of a child’s “biological
or adoptive mother and father is the greatest predictor” of positive outcomes for children.
Wardle, supra note 185, at 4 (emphasis added).
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Opponents’ efforts would be better spent strengthening the marital
presumption to the exclusion of nonmarital parentage.373
Second, and conversely, if marriage does not consistently confer
parental rights as it once did, the disaggregation of marriage and
parenthood might provide opportunities for the redefinition of par-
enthood around values such as biology, intentionality, or functional
parenting.374 This is arguably what has already begun to occur.
Forty percent of all births in this country are to unmarried
women;375 in other words, marriage is already doing less work to
establish parenthood and may soon do so only in a minority of cases.
By assigning maternal status to the birth mother and allowing
biologically related men to rebut marital presumption statutes, the
biological basis for parentage already rivals, and has arguably
supplanted, marriage.376 But biology imposes its own burdens.
Biology can trump social or functional claims to parenthood: those
who raise and care for children to whom they are not biologically re-
lated may find their parental interests unprotected.377 Individuals
without biological ties to their intended children—such as same-sex
partners who did not contribute genetic material—may have to
adopt their children to protect their parent-child relationship.378 In
response to this situation, scholars have pressed for greater recog-
nition of functional or social bases for parentage.379 
373. To be clear, this is not an approach I personally favor.
374. See Douglas NeJaime, The Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260, 2266-67 (2017)
(contextualizing the marital, biological, and social grounds for determining parentage).
375. See Unmarried Childbearing, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR.
FOR HEALTH STAT., https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/unmarried-childbearing.htm [https://
perma.cc/3A6U-KGHF].
376. See NeJaime, supra note 374, at 2275-78.
377. See, e.g., In re T.J.S., 16 A.3d 386, 388-89, 398 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011)
(holding that a nonbiologically related woman could not establish parenthood through intent);
L.P. v. L.F., 338 P.3d 908, 910, 921 (Wyo. 2014) (holding that a genetically unrelated man who
lived with a mother and child for approximately two years could not establish a parental
relationship); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status:
The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA.
L. REV. 879, 881-82 (1984).
378. See NeJaime, supra note 374, at 2312-14; Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not
Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-
First Century, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 206 (2009).
379. See NeJaime, supra note 374, at 2333; see also Courtney G. Joslin, Nurturing Parent-
hood Through the UPA (2017), 127 YALE L.J.F. 589, 592 (2018) (explaining how the newly
revised Uniform Parentage Act provides greater recognition of nonbiological parents).
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Although the refusal to recognize marital same-sex parents would
burden same-sex couples in the short term, the situation could lead
to greater recognition of nonbiological parental rights in the long
term. Here’s how: the breakdown of a marital relationship involving
children produces intertwined questions of custody and support. The
biological parent might resist sharing custody with her ex-spouse,
but both she and the state will face the competing desire to provide
the child with a second source of financial support.380 Because courts
often treat custody and support as intertwined, the compelling inter-
est in providing children with two sources of financial support381
could create pressure to recognize nonbiological spouses as parents
based on their caregiving or affiliation.382 For advocates of functional
parentage, the disintegration of the marital presumption could have
a surprising silver lining.383
B. Relationship Pluralism
Integration also sheds light on the issue of nonmarital relation-
ship recognition. The question whether and how to recognize a plu-
rality of relationship statuses has occupied family law scholars in
recent years.384 A few scholars have advocated authorizing multiple
forms of legal marriage.385 Scholars have supported the expansion
380. See, e.g., Turner v. Steiner, 398 P.3d 110, 112 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2017), abrogated by
McLaughlin v. Jones, 401 P.3d 492 (Ariz. 2017) (biological mother opposes ex-wife’s request
for custody but asks the court to award child support).
381. See Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making: An Interpretive Approach to the
Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV. L. REV. 835, 882 (2000) (arguing that the most
important policy goal underlying parentage “has been ensuring that children have at least
one, and preferably two, legal parents who are responsible for their care and support”).
382. See, e.g., Elisa B. v. Superior Court, 117 P.3d 660, 662 (Cal. 2005) (imposing support
obligations on a nonbirth mother based on her participation in the decision to have, and raise,
the couple’s children).
383. See generally Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129
HARV. L. REV. 1185 (2016) (demonstrating how exclusion of same-sex families from formal
legal recognition led to the recognition of novel kinship forms).
384. See William N. Eskridge Jr., Family Law Pluralism: The Guided-Choice Regime of
Menus, Default Rules, and Override Rules, 100 GEO. L.J. 1881, 1884 (2012) (surveying various
contributions).
385. See Teri Dobbins Baxter, Marriage on Our Own Terms, 41 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 1, 4 (2017) (arguing that states should offer multiple forms of marriage when couples
apply for licenses); Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance:
Personalizing the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453, 464-65 (1998) (arguing for the ability
of couples to legally define their own marriages); Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From
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of status alternatives to marriage, such as civil unions, domestic
partnerships, and designated beneficiaries;386 considered whether to
expand familial rights to relationships outside the traditional sexual
dyad;387 proposed the conscription of cohabitants into legally rec-
ognized statuses;388 and advocated for greater recognition of agree-
ments between intimate partners.389 When the impact of these
proposals on marriage has been considered at all, scholars have
focused on the propensity of alternate statuses to compete with
marriage.390 The goal for some, like Nancy Polikoff, has been to
“knock marriage off its perch,” or at least “mak[e] [it] matter less.”391
This Article’s study of disintegration suggests that a proliferation
of marriage forms or alternate statuses could undermine marriage
in other ways. Proposals to recognize alternatives to marriage have
not contended with the questions that integration poses regarding
information costs, and the impacts of those costs on both autonomy
and relationship stability. 
As discussed above, the legal system depends on social norms to
both convey the content of marital obligations and to police its
One-Size-Fits-All to Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1490-91 (2001)
(advocating that spouses have the power to create personalized marriage law).
386. See, e.g., John G. Culhane, After Marriage Equality, What’s Next for Relationship
Recognition?, 60 S.D. L. REV. 373, 382-85 (2015) (supporting the Designated Beneficiary
Agreement Act); Murray, supra note 195, at 300-05 (praising efforts to innovate with status
alternatives like municipal and state domestic partnerships).
387. See, e.g., POLIKOFF, supra note 44, at 123-45 (arguing for “valuing all families”); Laura
A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 191-93 (2007) (considering what
it would mean for the law to recognize friendship).
388. See, e.g., BOWMAN, supra note 115, at 6-8 (proposing imposing marital property obli-
gations on long-term cohabitants); Lawrence W. Waggoner, Marriage Is on the Decline and
Cohabitation Is on the Rise: At What Point, if Ever, Should Unmarried Partners Acquire
Marital Rights?, 50 FAM. L.Q. 215, 216 (2016) (proposing to treat long-term cohabitants as
married for all purposes).
389. See, e.g., Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. REV. 573, 576, 578-79 (2013)
(proposing “registered contractual relationships” as a legal-status alternative to marriage in
which couples sign a contract defining their rights and obligations to each other); Kaiponanea
T. Matsumura, Public Policing of Intimate Agreements, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 159, 159
(2013).
390. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 384, at 1959 (speculating that alternate statuses might
contribute to the decline of marriage by being more attractive options).
391. POLIKOFF, supra note 44, at 90 (advocating that we “knock marriage off its perch”);
id. at 151 (wanting to “mak[e] marriage matter less”); see also ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING
MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 5 (2012) (providing a comprehensive critique
of the inequities of marriage and advocating for “minimal marriage”).
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enforcement.392 If an alternate status expresses a value that directly
contradicts a marital norm—for example, if it provides legal recogni-
tion for polyamorous relationships, thereby challenging the marital
norm of sexual exclusivity—it might send a message that the law
does not value the norm.393 Other examples are easy to imagine. If
states wish to convey the importance of mutual financial inter-
dependency, the recognition of domestic partnerships that do not
involve the creation of shared property could undermine the con-
nection between relationships and property obligations.394 The same
could go for statuses that provide for easy exits from formal re-
lationships.395
Thus far, formal statuses such as domestic partnerships and civil
unions have taken the form of marriage-by-another-name or mar-
riage-lite, and for the most part have not articulated norms that
contradict marital norms.396 A more significant threat to primary
marital norms comes from the regulation of relationships like co-
habitation. As I have detailed in other work, cohabiting relation-
ships are tremendously diverse and vary in terms of partners’
subjective feelings of permanency, intimacy, and commitment.397
Proposals to regulate cohabiting relationships, such as the Amer-
ican Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
would treat cohabiting relationships of a certain duration like
marriages for the purposes of property distribution and support
obligations.398 Treating these relationships like marriages, even
though they do not necessarily embody the same commitment
norms, could dilute the strength of those marital norms.
A pluralistic approach is even more likely to threaten secondary
enforcement norms—the norms that enable the community to
392. See supra Part II.A.
393. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text (discussing the expressive function of
the law and its ability to influence norms).
394. Several populous municipalities have allowed people to register for domestic part-
nerships notwithstanding that those partnerships could not create joint property obligations.
See Murray, supra note 195, at 300.
395. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 299(a) (West 2011) (providing streamlined dissolution
procedures).
396. See Murray, supra note 195, at 296.
397. See Matsumura, supra note 308, at 1025-26.
398. See PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
MENDATIONS § 6.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2002).
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police, and to recognize who is policing, primary norms.399 If it is
difficult to tell who is married, in a formal union with a different set
of legal consequences, or a designated beneficiary relationship with
yet another set of obligations, it would not be immediately apparent
whether the couple is transgressing marital norms. The task be-
comes even more complicated if parties can alter their duties by
private agreement. As Eric Posner observed, if spouses are able to
privately agree to countenance extramarital sex, then it would be
prohibitively costly for the community to police the norm of fidelity:
the relevant source of information, the private agreement, would be
in the hands of the couple and unlikely to be divulged.400
Expanding the number of relationship forms can also impose
information-gathering costs that affect the administrability of laws
turning on relationship status. Some formal statuses rely on regis-
tries that enable the state to determine eligibility for a single pack-
age of state-provided benefits, so verification is not too costly.401 In
California, for example, registered domestic partners are entitled to
all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage at the statewide
level, but none at the federal level.402 But other statuses might
enable registrants to pick and choose the legal consequences of their
relationship, requiring more effort to determine what rights flow
from their status.403 In Colorado, for example, parties can execute
and record a designated beneficiary agreement that allows each
partner to grant or withhold sixteen categories of rights, including
employer-provided benefits, hospital visitation, medical decision
making, and intestate succession.404 The number of options creates
hundreds of possible variations, requiring the state and third par-
ties to study the registered agreement to determine its significance,
399. See McAdams, supra note 127, at 372; see also supra notes 132-35 and accompanying
text.
400. See POSNER, supra note 126, at 79-80.
401. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2007) (creating an official registration system
for domestic partnerships that convey all of the rights and responsibilities of marriage at the
state level).
402. See id.
403. See, e.g., Colorado Designated Beneficiary Agreement Act, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
15-22-101 to -112 (West 2009).
404. Id. § 15-22-106.
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and requiring the parties themselves to remember the varied legal
consequences of their beneficiary agreement.405 
Legal recognition of cohabitant rights creates an even greater
challenge. Whether the regulation takes the form of contract, as in
Marvin v. Marvin,406 or status, as Washington courts have recog-
nized,407 the couple’s legal relationship is not established until
adjudicated by a court. Both approaches are fact-intensive and in-
determinate.408 As a result, the government and third parties, and
even the partners themselves, do not know the legal consequences of
their relationship until it is subject to a legal dispute.409 The absence
of norms governing informal relationships means that the partners
themselves cannot—unlike married people—rely on an institution
with well-developed norms to inform them of their legal rights and
duties.
This last insight reveals a heretofore underexplored consequence
of disintegration: if parties can no longer easily understand the laws
and norms that govern them, how will that impact individual
autonomy? Certainly, the highly integrated system of coverture,
with its concomitant criminalization of extramarital intimacy,410
restricted the ability to make self-defining choices about intimate
relationships. It is hard not to view cases dismantling restrictions
on sex, contraception, and marital partners as promoting greater
individual freedom.411 Yet too much deregulation poses a challenge
of its own: people need clear options to make self-defining choices.412
405. See id. Further complicating matters, the statute will not enforce parts of the
registered agreement that conflict with “a superseding legal document.” Id. § 15-22-105(2).
406. See 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976) (en banc) (recognizing contracts—including pali-
mony—between cohabitants).
407. See Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 836 (Wash. 1995) (en banc) (holding that
couples in “a meretricious relationship” can create marriage-like property obligations).
408. See Matsumura, supra note 308, at 1040-42.
409. See id.
410. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
411. See Melissa Murray, Obergefell v. Hodges and Nonmarriage Inequality, 104 CALIF. L.
REV. 1207, 1216-25 (2016) (identifying Supreme Court decisions comprising a “jurisprudence
of nonmarriage”).
412. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 342, at 70 (“What is particularly significant to
choice, and thus to autonomy, is the multiplicity of alternatives within any given sphere.”);
see also supra notes 339, 343-44 and accompanying text. If the goal is to match legal rules to
the relevant conduct, the unbundling of legal rights is a necessary first step. That said, the
functional approach would also seemingly depend on relatively intelligible norms to match
conduct to consequence.
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The number of rights and obligations that could possibly turn on
relationship status is in the thousands.413 People simply cannot
understand, develop a preference for, and (where applicable)
negotiate all of these obligations.414 Without certainty as to these
obligations—heretofore enforced somewhat passably by social
norms—relationships would also lack stability. Autonomy may
require a plurality of choices, but not necessarily an infinite variety.
These concerns need not be dispositive. I favor the proliferation
of legal alternatives to marriage notwithstanding these concerns.415
But proposals to expand the regulation of intimate relationships
cannot ignore them. From the perspective of both administrability
and autonomy, the success of a relationship regulation regime
premised on a plurality of statuses cannot simply overthrow mar-
riage. In fact, success might depend on quite the opposite: optimally
integrated marriage paired with an optimal number of alternatives
with the optimal degree of variance.416 The full articulation of this
optimization is beyond the scope of this Article, but the foregoing
analysis suggests that forms should be distinct enough that they do
not cause confusion, and simple enough that—similar to in rem
rights as described by Merrill and Smith417—they can project their
consequences to the partners, state, and third parties. Consistent
with the recommendations of some scholars, this approach might
leave little room for active regulation of informal relationships,
favoring a contractual approach.418 
413. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2601 (2015) (citing United States v.
Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 752 (2013)) (noting that over a thousand provisions of federal law turn
on marital status).
414. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 342, at 128 (noting problems with cognitive overload
in the face of too many options).
415. I also favor the preservation of a space outside of marriage for couples who want to
escape the law’s regulation. See Matsumura, supra note 308, at 1013-14 (arguing that the law
should not regulate intimate conduct in the absence of the parties’ consent); cf. Melissa
Murray, Rights and Regulation: The Evolution of Sexual Regulation, 116 COLUM. L. REV. 573,
582-84 (2016) (arguing that Lawrence v. Texas created an “interstitial space” in the marriage-
crime binary for licit, unregulated sexual conduct).
416. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 342, at 106.
417. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
418. See Carbone & Cahn, supra note 176, at 95-96, 112 (noting that cohabiting couples do
not marry for a reason, and suggesting that their responsibilities regarding property be con-
fined to those they agreed to and those justified by the way they conducted themselves).
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Focusing on integration and disintegration also opens new av-
enues for thinking about intimate contracting. Courts are much
more likely to enforce agreements between partners and spouses
regarding money or property than they are when the terms are
nonmonetary.419 The refusal to enforce nonmonetary terms reflects
and reinforces traditional views about sexuality and gender roles.420
Concerns about information costs actually suggest that the opposite
should be true. Third parties and the state have little legitimate
interest in the performance of intimate duties421—regarding, for
instance, how much and when spouses should have sex422—and the
parties are in the best position to monitor the performance of par-
ticularized commitments regarding sex and intimacy. The state and
third parties are much more likely to care about whether the part-
ners are an interdependent financial unit,423 but are ill-equipped to
discover the partners’ private financial arrangements. The integra-
tion framework provides a justification for limiting such terms, or
making them the subject of mandatory disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Two debates about the nature of marriage have occupied scholars
for years. First, where does marriage fall on the continuum of status
and contract?424 Second, does marriage have a positive dimension,
or is it merely whatever collection of rights the state deigns to pro-
vide? In other words, are states constitutionally compelled to pro-
vide a particular set of laws known as “marriage,” or are they free
to alter or even abolish it?425
This Article identifies a third way of thinking about the nature of
marriage. It focuses on the inevitable changes to the positive law of
marriage and argues that those changes can make marriage more
or less integrated, both in terms of rights and norms and across
419. See Silbaugh, supra note 106, at 66-67.
420. See Matsumura, supra note 389, at 190-95.
421. Lawrence v. Texas teaches that the state has little business regulating the private,
consensual, nonharmful intimate conduct of adults. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
422. See, e.g., Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873, 875 (La. Ct. App. 1976) (involving an
agreement limiting sex to once a week).
423. See supra notes 328-32 and accompanying text.
424. See Halley, supra note 38, at 6.
425. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
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source. It also identifies benefits and costs of integration, demon-
strating the extent to which marriage relies on effectively communi-
cating information about its content but noting the downsides of
centralization and state control. This integration framework not
only clarifies the terms by which legal change should be assessed,
but enables a more principled analysis of efforts targeted at reform-
ing marriage laws and recognizing nonmarital relationships.
